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Abstract
We show new information-theoretic lower bounds on the sample complexity of (ε, δ)-differentially
private algorithms that accurately answer large sets of counting queries. A counting query on a
database D ∈ ({0, 1}d)n has the form “What fraction of the individual records in the database
satisfy the property q?” We show that in order to answer an arbitrary set Q of  d/α2 counting
queries on D to within error ±α it is necessary that
n ≥ Ω˜
(√
d log |Q|
α2ε
)
.
This bound is optimal up to poly-logarithmic factors, as demonstrated by the Private Multi-
plicative Weights algorithm (Hardt and Rothblum, FOCS’10). In particular, our lower bound is
the first to show that the sample complexity required for accuracy and (ε, δ)-differential privacy
is asymptotically larger than what is required merely for accuracy, which is O(log |Q|/α2). In
addition, we show that our lower bound holds for the specific case of k-way marginal queries
(where |Q| = 2k(dk)) when α is not too small compared to d (e.g. when α is any fixed constant).
Our results rely on the existence of short fingerprinting codes (Boneh and Shaw, CRYPTO’95;
Tardos, STOC’03), which we show are closely connected to the sample complexity of differentially
private data release. We also give a new method for combining certain types of sample complexity
lower bounds into stronger lower bounds.
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1 Introduction
Consider a database D ∈ X n, in which each of the n rows corresponds to an individual’s record,
and each record is an element of some data universe X (e.g. X = {0, 1}d, corresponding to d binary
attributes per record). The goal of privacy-preserving data analysis is to enable rich statistical
analyses on such a database while protecting the privacy of the individuals. It is especially desirable
to achieve (ε, δ)-differential privacy [DMNS06, DKM+06], which (for suitable choices of ε and
δ) guarantees that no individual’s data has a significant influence on the information released
about the database. A natural way to measure the tradeoff between these two goals is via sample
complexity—the minimum number of records n such that there exists a (possibly computationally
unbounded) algorithm that achieves both differential privacy and statistical accuracy.
Some of the most basic statistics are counting queries, which are queries of the form “What
fraction of individual records in D satisfy some property q?” In particular, we would like to design
an algorithm that takes as input a database D and, for some family of counting queries Q, outputs
an approximate answer to each of the queries in Q that is accurate to within, say, ±.01. Suppose
we are given a bound on the number of queries |Q| and the dimensionality of the database records
d, but otherwise allow the family Q to be arbitrary. What is the sample complexity required to
achieve (ε, δ)-differential privacy and statistical accuracy for Q?
Of course, if we drop the requirement of privacy, then we could achieve perfect accuracy when
D contains any number of records. However, in many interesting settings the database D consists
of random samples from some larger population, and an analyst is actually interested in answering
the queries on the population. Thus, even without a privacy constraint, D would need to contain
enough records to ensure that (with high probability) for every query q ∈ Q, the answer to q on
D is close to the answer to q on the whole population, say within ±.01. To achieve this form of
statistical accuracy, it is well-known that it is necessary and sufficient for D to contain Θ(log |Q|)
samples.1 In this work we consider whether there is an additional “price of differential privacy” if we
require both statistical accuracy and (ε, δ)-differential privacy (for, say, ε = O(1), δ = o(1/n)). This
benchmark has often been used to evaluate the utility of differentially private algorithms, beginning
with the seminal work of Dinur and Nissim [DN03].
Some of the earliest work in differential privacy [DN03, DN04, BDMN05, DMNS06] gave an
algorithm—the so-called Laplace mechanism—whose sample complexity is Θ˜(|Q|1/2), and thus
incurs a large price of differential privacy. Fortunately, a remarkable result of Blum, Ligett, and
Roth [BLR08] showed that the dependence on |Q| can be improved exponentially to O(d log |Q|)
where d is the dimensionality of the data. Their work was improved on in several important
aspects [DNR+09, DRV10, RR10, HR10, GRU12, HLM12]. The current best upper bound on
the sample complexity is O(
√
d log |Q|), which is obtained via the private multiplicative weights
mechanism of Hardt and Rothblum [HR10].
These results show that the price of privacy is small for datasets with few attributes, but may
be large for high-dimensional datasets. For example, if we simply want to estimate the mean of each
of the d attributes without a privacy guarantee, then Θ(log d) samples are necessary and sufficient
to get statistical accuracy. However, the best known (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithm requires
Ω(
√
d) samples—an exponential gap. In the special case of pure (ε, 0)-differential privacy, a lower
bound of Ω(d) is known [HT10]. However, for the general case of approximate (ε, δ)-differential
1For a specific family of queries Q, the necessary and sufficient number of samples is proportional to the VC-
dimension of Q, which can be as large as log |Q|.
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privacy the best known lower bound is Ω(log d) [DN03]. More generally, there are no known lower
bounds that separate the sample complexity of (ε, δ)-differential privacy from the sample complexity
required for statistical accuracy alone.
In this work we close this gap almost completely, and show that there is indeed a “price of
approximate differential privacy” for high-dimensional datasets.
Theorem 1.1 (Informal). Any algorithm that takes as input a database D ∈ ({0, 1}d)n, satisfies
approximate differential privacy, and estimates the mean of each of the d attributes to within error
±1/3 requires n ≥ Ω˜(√d) samples.
We establish this lower bound using a combinatorial object called a fingerprinting code, which
was originally introduced by Boneh and Shaw [BS98] for the problem of watermarking copyrighted
content. Specifically, we use Tardos’ construction of optimal fingerprinting codes [Tar08]. The use of
“secure content distribution schemes” to prove lower bounds for differential privacy originates with
the work of Dwork et al. [DNR+09], who used “traitor-tracing schemes,” which are a cryptographic
analogue of information-theoretic fingerprinting codes, to prove computational hardness results for
differential privacy. Extending this connection, Ullman [Ull13] used fingerprinting codes to construct
a novel traitor-tracing scheme and obtain a strong computational hardness result for differential
privacy.2 Here we show that a direct use of fingerprinting codes yields information-theoretic lower
bounds on sample complexity.
Using the additional structure of Tardos’ fingerprinting code, we are able to prove statistical
minimax lower bounds for inferring the marginals of a product distribution from samples while
guaranteeing differential privacy for the sample. Specifically, suppose the database D ∈ ({0, 1}d)n
consists of n independent samples from a product distribution over {0, 1}d such that the i-th
coordinate of each sample is set to 1 with probability pi, for some unknown p = (p1, . . . , pd) ∈ [0, 1]d.
We show that if there exists a differentially private algorithm that takes such a database as input,
satisfies approximate differential privacy, and outputs pˆ such that ‖pˆ− p‖∞ ≤ 1/3, then n ≥ Ω˜(
√
d).
Statistical minimax bounds of this type for differentially private inference problems were first studied
by Duchi, Jordan, and Wainwright [DJW13], who proved minimax bounds for algorithms that
satisfy the stronger constraint of local pure (ε, 0)-differential privacy.
Next, we consider the sample complexity of answering an arbitrary set Q of counting queries to
within error ±α. As above, if we assume the database contains samples from a population, and
require only that the answers to queries on the sampled database and the population are close,
to within ±α, then Θ(log |Q|/α2) samples are necessary and sufficient for just statistical accuracy.
When |Q| is large (relative to d and 1/α), the best sample complexity for differential privacy is
again achieved by the private multiplicative weights algorithm, and is O(
√
d log |Q|/α2). For pure
differential privacy, a lower bound of Ω(d log |Q|/α2) is known [Har11]. On the other hand, the best
known lower bound for approximate differential privacy is Ω(max{log |Q|/α, 1/α2}), which follows
from the techniques of [DN03]. To resolve this gap, we give a composition theorem that allows us
to obtain a nearly optimal lower bound by combining Theorem 1.1 with (variants of) the existing
sample complexity lower bounds. The result shows that the private multiplicative weights algorithm
achieves nearly-optimal sample-complexity as a function of |Q|, d, and α.
2In fact, one way to prove Theorem 1.1 is by replacing the one-way functions in [Ull13] with a random oracle, and
thereby obtain an information-theoretically secure traitor-tracing scheme.
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Theorem 1.2 (Informal). For every sufficiently small α > 0, d ≥ 6 log(1/α), and s ≥ d/α2,
there exists a family of queries Q of size s such that any algorithm that takes as input a database
D ∈ ({0, 1}d)n, satisfies approximate differential privacy, and outputs an approximate answer to
each query in Q to within ±α requires n ≥ Ω˜(√d log |Q|/α2).
We remark that the condition that d ≥ 6 log(1/α) is both necessary (up to the constant factor)
and fairly mild. Necessary because the noisy histogram algorithm (see, e.g. [Vad16]) requires
n = O(2d/2
√
log |Q|/α) samples, which is better than the conclusion of the lower bound when
d < 2 log(1/α). Mild because differential privacy cannot be satisfied for large query sets unless
α & 1/√n, so the condition is no stronger than assuming n . 2d/3, in which case the number of
samples is exponential in the dimension. Similarly, the condition s ≥ d/α2 is also necessary, since
adding independent noise to each query requires only n & |Q|1/2/α samples.
Finally, we consider the sample complexity of the natural and well studied class of k-way marginal
queries, also known as k-way conjunction queries (see e.g. [BCD+07, KRSU10, GHRU11, TUV12,
CTUW14, DNT13]). A k-way marginal query on a database D ∈ ({0, 1}d)n is specified by a set
S ⊆ [d], |S| ≤ k, and a pattern t ∈ {0, 1}|S| and asks “What fraction of records in D has each
attribute j in S set to tj?” The number of k-way marginal queries on {0, 1}d is about 2k
(
d
k
)
. For
the special case of k = 1, the queries simply ask for the mean of each attribute, which was discussed
above. We prove that the lower bound of Theorem 1.2, which applies to worst-case queries, also
holds for the special case of k-way marginal queries when α is not too small.
Theorem 1.3 (Informal). Any algorithm that takes a database D ∈ ({0, 1}d)n, satisfies approximate
differential privacy, and outputs an approximate answer to each of the k-way marginal queries to
within ±α (for α smaller than some universal constant and larger than an inverse polynomial in d)
requires n ≥ Ω˜(k√d/α2).
We remark that, since the number of k-way marginal queries is about 2k
(
d
k
)
, the sample
complexity lower bound in Theoem 1.3 essentially matches that of Theorem 1.2. The two theorems
are incomparable, since Theorem 1.2 applies even when α is exponentially small in d, but only
applies for a worst-case family of queries.
1.1 Our Techniques
We now describe the main technical ingredients used to prove these results. For concreteness, we
will describe the main ideas for the case of k-way marginal queries.
Fingerprinting Codes. Fingerprinting codes, introduced by Boneh and Shaw [BS98], were
originally designed to address the problem of watermarking copyrighted content. Roughly speaking,
a (fully-collusion-resilient) fingerprinting code is a way of generating codewords for n users in such
a way that any codeword can be uniquely traced back to a user. Each legitimate copy of a piece of
digital content has such a codeword hidden in it, and thus any illegal copy can be traced back to
the user who copied it. Moreover, even if an arbitrary subset of the users collude to produce a copy
of the content, then under a certain marking assumption, the codeword appearing in the copy can
still be traced back to one of the users who contributed to it. The standard marking assumption
is that if every colluder has the same bit b in the j-th bit of their codeword, then the j-th bit of
the “combined” codeword in the copy they produce must be also b. We refer the reader to the
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original paper of Boneh and Shaw [BS98] for the motivation behind the marking assumption and an
explanation of how fingerprinting codes can be used to watermark digital content.
We show that the existence of short fingerprinting codes implies sample complexity lower bounds
for 1-way marginal queries. Recall that a 1-way marginal query qj is specified by an integer j ∈ [d]
and asks simply “What fraction of records in D have a 1 in the j-th bit?” Suppose a coalition of
users takes their codewords and builds a database D ∈ ({0, 1}d)n where each record contains one of
their codewords, and d is the length of the codewords. Consider the 1-way marginal query qj(D). If
every user in S has a bit b in the j-th bit of their codeword, then qj(D) = b. Thus, if an algorithm
answers 1-way marginal queries on D with non-trivial accuracy, its output can be used to obtain a
combined codeword that satisfies the marking assumption. By the tracing property of fingerprinting
codes, we can use the combined codeword to identify one of the users in the database. However, if
we can identify one of the users from the answers, then the algorithm is not differentially private.
This argument can be formalized to show that if there is a fingerprinting code for n users with
codewords of length d, then the sample complexity of answering 1-way marginals must be at least n.
The nearly-optimal construction of fingerprinting codes due to Tardos [Tar08], gives fingerprinting
codes with codewords of length d = O˜(n2), which implies a lower bound of n ≥ Ω˜(√d) on the sample
complexity required to answer 1-way marginals queries.
Composition of Sample Complexity Lower Bounds. Suppose we want to prove a lower
bound of Ω˜(k
√
d) for answering k-way marginals up to accuracy ±.01 (a special case of Theorem 1.3).
Given our lower bound of Ω˜(
√
d) for 1-way marginals, and the known lower bound of Ω(k) for
answering k-way marginals implicit in [DN03, Rot10], a natural approach is to somehow compose
the two lower bounds to obtain a nearly-optimal lower bound of Ω˜(k
√
d). Our composition technique
uses the idea of the Ω(k) lower bound from [DN03, Rot10] to show that if we can answer k-way
marginal queries on a large database D with n rows, then we can obtain the answers to the 1-way
marginal queries on a “subdatabase” of roughly n/k rows. Our lower bound for 1-way marginals
tell us that n/k = Ω˜(
√
d), so we deduce n = Ω˜(k
√
d).
Actually, this reduction only gives accurate answers to most of the 1-way marginals on the
subdatabase, so we need an extension of our lower bound for 1-way marginals to differentially private
algorithms that are allowed to answer a small fraction of the queries with arbitrarily large error.
Proving a sample complexity lower bound for this problem requires a “robust” fingerprinting code
whose tracing algorithm can trace codewords that have errors introduced into a small fraction of
the bits. We show how to construct such a robust fingerprinting code of length d = O˜(n2), and thus
obtain the desired lower bound. Fingerprinting codes satisfying a weaker notion of robustness were
introduced by Boneh and Naor [BN08, BKM10].3
Theorems 1.2 and 1.3 are proven by using this composition technique repeatedly to combine our
lower bound for 1-way marginals with (variants of) several known lower bounds that capture the
optimal dependence on log |Q| and 1/α2.
Are Fingerprinting Codes Necessary to Prove Differential Privacy Lower Bounds?
The connection between fingerprinting codes and differential privacy lower bounds extends to
arbitrary families Q of counting queries. We introduce the notion of a generalized fingerprinting code
with respect to Q, where each codeword corresponds to a data universe element x ∈ X and the bits
3In the fingerprinting codes of [BN08, BKM10] the adversary is allowed to erase a large fraction of the coordinates
of the combined codeword, and must reveal which coordinates are erased.
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of the codeword are given by q(x) for each q ∈ Q, but is the same as an ordinary fingerprinting code
otherwise. The existence of a generalized fingerprinting code with respect to Q, for n users, implies
a sample complexity lower bound of n for privately releasing answers to Q. We also show a partial
converse to the above result, which states that some sort of “fingerprinting-code-like object” is
necessary to prove sample complexity lower bounds for answering counting queries under differential
privacy. This object has similar semantics to a generalized fingerprinting code, however the marking
assumption required for tracing is slightly stronger and the probability that tracing succeeds can be
significantly smaller than what is required by the standard definition of fingerprinting codes. Our
partial converse parallels the result of Dwork et al. [DNR+09] that shows computational hardness
results for differential privacy imply a “traitor-tracing-like object.” We leave it as an open question
to pin down precisely the relationship between fingerprinting codes and information-theoretic lower
bounds in differential privacy (and also between traitor-tracing schemes and computational hardness
results for differential privacy).
1.2 Other Related Work
1.2.1 Previous Work
We have mostly focused on the sample complexity as a function of the number of queries, the
number of attributes d, and the accuracy parameter α. There have been several works focused on
the sample complexity as a function of the specific family Q of queries. For (ε, 0)-differential privacy,
Hardt and Talwar [HT10] showed how to approximately characterize the sample complexity of a
family Q when the accuracy parameter α is sufficiently small. Nikolov, Talwar, and Zhang [NTZ13]
extended their results to give an approximate characterization for (ε, δ)-differential privacy and
for the full range of accuracy parameters. Specifically, [NTZ13] give an (ε, δ)-differentially private
algorithm that answers any family of queries Q on {0, 1}d with error α using a number of samples
that is optimal up to a factor of poly(d, log |Q|) that is independent of α. Thus, their algorithm has
sample complexity that depends optimally on α. However, their characterization may be loose by a
factor of poly(d, log |Q|). In fact, when α is a constant, the lower bound on the sample complexity
given by their characterization is always O(1), whereas their algorithm requires poly(d, log |Q|)
samples to give non-trivially accurate answers. In contrast, our lower bounds are tight to within
poly(log d, log log |Q|, log(1/α)) factors, and thus give meaningful lower bounds even when α is
constant, but apply only to certain families of queries.
There have been attempts to prove optimal sample complexity lower bounds for k-way marginals.
In particular, when k is a constant, Kasiviswanathan et al. [KRSU10] and De [De12] prove a lower
bound of min{|Q|1/2/α, 1/α2} on the sample complexity. Note that when α is a constant, these
lower bounds are O(1).
There have also been attempts to explicitly and precisely determine the sample complexity
of even simpler query families than k-way conjunctions, such as point functions and threshold
functions [BKN10, BNS13a, BNS13b, BNSV15]. These works show that these families can have
sample complexity lower than O˜(
√
d log |Q|/α2).
In addition to the general computational hardness results referenced above, there are several
results that show stronger hardness results for restricted types of efficient algorithms [UV11,
GHRU11, DNV12].
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1.2.2 Subsequent Work
Subsequent to our work, Steinke and Ullman [SU15a] refined our use of fingerprinting codes to prove
a lower bound of Ω(
√
d log(1/δ)/ε) on the number of samples required to release the mean of each
of the d attributes under (ε, δ)-differential privacy when δ  1/n. This lower bound is optimal up
to constant factors, and improves on Theorem 1.1 by a factor of roughly
√
log(1/δ) · log d. They
also improve and simplify our analysis of robust fingerprinting codes.
Our fingerprinting code technique has also been used to prove lower bounds for other types
of differentially private data analyses. Namely, Dwork et al. [DTTZ14] prove lower bounds for
differentially private principal component analysis and Bassily, Smith, and Thakurta [BST14] prove
lower bounds for differentially private empirical risk minimization. In order to establish lower bounds
for privately releasing threshold functions, Bun et al. [BNSV15] construct a fingerprinting-code-like
object that yields a lower bound for the problem of releasing a value between the minimum and
maximum of a dataset.
Dwork et al. [DSS+15] observe that the privacy attack implicit in our negative results is closely
related to the influential attacks that were employed by Homer et al. [HSR+08] (and further studied
in [SOJH09]) to violate privacy of public genetic datasets. Using this connection, they show how to
make Homer et al.’s attack robust to very general models of noise and how to make the attack work
without detailed knowledge of the population the dataset represents.
A pair of works [HU14, SU15b] show that fingerprinting codes and the related traitor-tracing
schemes imply both information-theoretic lower bounds and computational hardness results for
the “false discovery” problem in adaptive data analysis. Specifically, they show lower bounds for
answering an online sequence of adaptively chosen counting queries where the database is a sample
from some unknown distribution and the answers must be accurate with respect to that distribution.
These works [HU14, SU15b] effectively reverse a connection established in [DFH+15, BSSU15],
which used differentially private algorithms to obtain positive results for this problem.
Our technique for composing lower bounds in differential privacy has also found applications
outside of privacy. Specifically, Liberty et al. [LMTU14] used this technique to prove nearly optimal
lower bounds on the space required to “sketch” a database while approximately preserving answers
to k-way marginal queries (called “frequent itemset queries” in their work).
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Differential Privacy
We define a database D ∈ X n to be an ordered tuple of n rows (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X chosen from a data
universe X . We say that two databases D,D′ ∈ X n are adjacent if they differ only by a single row,
and we denote this by D ∼ D′. In particular, we can replace the ith row of a database D with
some fixed “junk” element of X to obtain another database D−i ∼ D. We emphasize that if D is a
database of size n, then D−i is also a database of size n.
Definition 2.1 (Differential Privacy [DMNS06]). Let A : X n → R be a randomized algorithm
(where n is a varying parameter). A is (ε, δ)-differentially private if for every two adjacent databases
D ∼ D′ and every subset S ⊆ R,
Pr [A(D) ∈ S] ≤ eε Pr[A(D′) ∈ S] + δ.
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Lemma 2.2. Let A : X n → R be a randomized algorithm such that for every D ∈ X n, every
i, j ∈ [n], and every subset S ⊆ R,
Pr [A(D−i) ∈ S] ≤ eεPr [A(D−j) ∈ S] + δ.
Let ⊥ denote the fixed junk element of X . Then A′ : X n−1 → R defined by A′(x1, . . . , xn−1) =
A(x1, . . . , xn−1,⊥) is (2ε, (eε + 1)δ)-differentially private.
Proof. Let D = (x1, . . . , xn−1) and D′ = (x1, . . . , x′i, . . . , xn−1) be adjacent databases. Then for any
S ⊆ R, we have
Pr
[A′(D) ∈ S] = Pr [A(x1, . . . , xn−1,⊥) ∈ S]
≤ eεPr [A(x1, . . . , xi−1,⊥, xi+1, . . . , xn−1,⊥) ∈ S] + δ
≤ e2εPr [A(x1, . . . , xi−1, x′i, xi+1, . . . , xn−1,⊥) ∈ S]+ (eε + 1)δ
= e2εPr
[A′(D′) ∈ S]+ (eε + 1)δ.
2.2 Counting Queries and Accuracy
In this paper we study algorithms that answer counting queries. A counting query on X is defined
by a predicate q : X → {0, 1}. Abusing notation, we define the evaluation of the query q on a
database D = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X n to be its average value over the rows,
q(D) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
q(xi).
Definition 2.3 (Accuracy for Counting Queries). Let Q be a set of counting queries on X and
α, β ∈ [0, 1] be parameters. For a database D ∈ X n, a sequence of answers a = (aq)q∈Q ∈ R|Q| is
(α, β)-accurate for Q if |q(D)− aq| ≤ α for at least a 1− β fraction of queries q ∈ Q.
Let A : X n → R|Q| be a randomized algorithm. A is (α, β)-accurate for Q if for every D ∈ X n,
Pr [A(D) is (α, β)-accurate for Q] ≥ 2/3.
When β = 0 we may simply write that a or A is α-accurate for Q.
In the definition of accuracy, we have assumed that A outputs a sequence of |Q| real-valued
answers, with aq representing the answer to q. Since we are not concerned with the running time of
the algorithm, this assumption is without loss of generality.4
An important example of a collection of counting queries is the set of k-way marginals. For all
of our results it will be sufficient to consider only the set of monotone k-way marginals.
Definition 2.4 (Monotone k-way Marginals). A (monotone) k-way marginal qS over {0, 1}d is
specified by a subset S ⊆ [d] of size |S| ≤ k. It takes the value qS(x) = 1 if and only if xi = 1 for
every index i ∈ S. The collection of all (monotone) k-way marginals is denoted by Mk,d.
4In certain settings, A is allowed to output a “summary” z ∈ R for some range R. In this case, we would also
require that there exists an “evaluator” E : R×Q → R that takes a summary and a query and returns an answer
E(z, q) = aq that approximates q(D). The extra generality is used to allow A to run in less time than the number of
queries it is answering. However, since we do not bound the running time of A we can convert any such sanitizer to
one that outputs a sequence of |Q| real-valued answers simply by running the evaluator for every q ∈ Q.
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2.3 Sample Complexity
In this work we prove lower bounds on the sample complexity required to simultaneously achieve
differential privacy and accuracy.
Definition 2.5 (Sample Complexity). Let Q be a set of counting queries on X and let α, β > 0
be parameters, and let ε, δ be functions of n. We say that (Q,X ) has sample complexity n∗ for
(α, β)-accuracy and (ε, δ)-differential privacy if n∗ is the least n ∈ N such that there exists an
(ε, δ)-differentially private algorithm A : X n → R|Q| that is (α, β)-accurate for Q.
We will focus on the case where ε = O(1) and δ = o(1/n). This setting of the parameters
is essentially the most-permissive for which (ε, δ)-differential privacy is still a meaningful privacy
definition. However, pinning down the exact dependence on ε and δ is still of interest. Regarding ε,
this can be done via the following standard lemma, which allows us to take ε = 1 without loss of
generality.
Lemma 2.6. For every set of counting queries Q, universe X , α, β ∈ [0, 1], ε ≤ 1. (Q,X ) has
sample complexity n∗ for (α, β)-accuracy and (1, o(1/n))-differential privacy if and only if it has
sample complexity Θ(n∗/ε) for (α, β)-accuracy and (ε, o(1/n))-differential privacy.
One direction (O(n∗/ε) samples are sufficient) is the “secrecy-of-the-sample lemma,” which
appeared implicitly in [KLN+11]. The other direction (Ω(n∗/ε) samples are necessary) appears to
be folklore.
The next lemma allows us to generically translate sample complexity lower bounds for constant
accuracy into lower bounds that depend on the error parameter α. For some sets of queries, such as
1-way marginals, the dependence we get on α is tight. However, as we will see in Section 5, we can
obtain lower bounds with an even stronger dependence on α for specific sets of queries.
Lemma 2.7. Let Q be a set of counting queries on X and let β, ε, δ > 0. Suppose (Q,X ) has sample
complexity n∗ for (α0, β)-accuracy and (ε, δ)-differential privacy, where α0 ∈ (0, 1) is a constant.
Then (Q,X ) has sample complexity Ω(n∗/α) for (α, β, γ)-accuracy and (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
Proof. Let A : Xm → R|Q| be an (ε, δ)-differentially private and (α, β)-accurate mechanism for
releasing answers to Q. We will use A to construct an mechanism A′ : X n → R|Q| achieving constant
accuracy α0 on databases of size n = dmα/α0e. To do so, fix a (publicly known) element x0 ∈ X .
On input a database D′ ∈ X n, the mechanism A′ “pads” D′ by appending m − n copies of x0,
producing a database D. It then runs A on D, obtaining answers (aq)q∈Q. Finally, it releases
answers (a′q)q∈Q where a′q =
1
n(maq − (m− n)q(x0)).
The mechanism A′ inherits (ε, δ)-differential privacy from A, since changing one row of D′
changes one row of the padded database D′. Now we argue accuracy. Suppose aq is an answer such
that |aq − q(D)| ≤ α. Note that by construction, q(D) = 1m(nq(D′) + (m − n)q(x0)), and hence
q(D′) = 1n(mq(D)− (m− n)q(x0)). Thus we have
|a′q − q(D′)| =
1
n
|maq − (m− n)q(x0)− (mq(D)− (m− n)q(x0))|
=
m
n
|aq − q(D)|
≤ m
n
· α.
Taking n = dmα/α0e makes this quantity at most α0, completing the proof.
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For context, we can restate some prior results on differentially private counting query release in
our sample-complexity terminology.
Theorem 2.8 (Combination of [DN03, DN04, BDMN05, DMNS06, BLR08, HR10, GRU12]). For
every set of counting queries Q on X and every α > 0, (Q,X ) has sample complexity at most
min
{
O˜
(√|Q|
α
)
, O˜
(√|X | log |Q|
α
)
, O˜
(√
log |X | log |Q|
α2
)}
for (α, 0)-accuracy and (1, o(1/n))-differential privacy.
We are mostly interested in a setting of parameters where α is not too small (e.g. constant) and
log |X |  |Q| ≤ poly(|X |). In this regime the best known sample complexity will be achieved by
the final expression, corresponding to the private multiplicative weights algorithm [HR10] using the
analysis of [GRU12]. In light of Lemma 2.6, it is without loss of generality that we have stated
these upper bounds for ε = 1.
The next theorem shows that, when the data universe is not too small, the private multiplicative
weights algorithm is nearly-optimal as a function of |Q| and 1/α when each parameter is considered
individually.
Theorem 2.9 (Combination of [DN03, Rot10]). For every s ∈ N, and α ∈ (0, 1/4), there exists a
set of s counting queries Q on a data universe X of size max{log s,O(1/α2)} such that (Q,X ) has
sample complexity at least
max
{
Ω
(
log |Q|
α
)
,Ω
(
1
α2
)}
for (α, 0)-accuracy and (1, o(1/n))-differential privacy.
2.4 Re-identifiable Distributions
All of our eventual lower bounds will take the form of a “re-identification” attack, in which we
possess data from a large number of individuals, and identify one such individual who was included
in the database. In this attack, we choose a distribution on databases and give an adversary 1) a
database D drawn from that distribution and 2) either A(D) or A(D−i) for some row i, where A is
an alleged sanitizer. The adversary’s goal is to identify a row of D that was given to the sanitizer.
We say that the distribution is re-identifiable if there is an adversary who can identify such a row
with sufficiently high confidence whenever A outputs accurate answers. If the adversary can do
so, it means that there must be a pair of adjacent databases D ∼ D−i such that the adversary can
distinguish A(D) from A(D−i), which means A cannot be differentially private.
Definition 2.10 (Re-identifiable Distribution). For a data universe X and n ∈ N, let D be a
distribution on n-row databases D ∈ X n. Let Q be a family of counting queries on X and let
γ, ξ, α, β ∈ [0, 1] be parameters. The distribution D is (γ, ξ)-re-identifiable from (α, β)-accurate
answers to Q if there exists a (possibly randomized) adversary B : X n ×R|Q| → [n] ∪ {⊥} such that
for every randomized algorithm A : X n → R|Q|, the following both hold:
1. PrD←RD [(B(D,A(D)) = ⊥) ∧ (A(D) is (α, β)-accurate for Q)] ≤ γ.
2. For every i ∈ [n], PrD←RD [B(D,A(D−i)) = i] ≤ ξ.
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Here the probability is taken over the choice of D and i as well as the coins of A and B. We allow
D and B to share a common state.
Note that, when row i is not in the dataset, then it would be an error for B to declare that row
i is in the dataset, and condition 2 requires that the probability of this error occurring is at most ξ.
The common state between D and B should be thought of as auxiliary information about the
realization of D that may help B identify a user i. Formally, we could model this shared state
by having D output an additional string aux that is given to B but not to A. However, we make
the shared state implicit to reduce notational clutter. The need for this shared state will become
apparent when we use fingerprinting codes to construct re-identifiable distributions; in the context
of fingerprinting codes, the shared state represents auxiliary information about a codebook that
helps the Trace algorithm accuse a guilty pirate.
If A is an (α, β)-accurate algorithm, then its output A(D) will be (α, β)-accurate with probability
at least 2/3. Therefore, if γ < 2/3, we can conclude that Pr [B(D,A(D)) ∈ [n]] ≥ 1−γ−1/3 = Ω(1).
In particular, there exists some i∗ ∈ [n] for which Pr [B(D,A(D)) = i∗] ≥ Ω(1/n). However, if
ξ = o(1/n), then Pr [B(D,A(D−i∗)) = i∗] ≤ ξ = o(1/n). Thus, for this choice of γ and ξ we will
obtain a contradiction to (ε, δ)-differential privacy of the post-processed algorithm B(D,A(·)) for
any ε = O(1) and δ = o(1/n). Note that this conclusion holds even if D and B share a common
state. We summarize this argument with the following lemma.
Lemma 2.11. Let Q be a family of counting queries on X , n ∈ N and ξ ∈ [0, 1]. Suppose there exists
a distribution on n-row databases D ∈ X n that is (γ, ξ)-re-identifiable from (α, β)-accurate answers
to Q. Then there is no (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithm A : X n → R|Q| that is (α, β)-accurate
for Q for any ε, δ such that e−ε(1− γ − 1/3)/n− δ ≥ ξ.
In particular, if there exists a distribution that is (γ, o(1/n))-re-identifiable from (α, β)-accurate
answers to Q for γ = 1/3, then no algorithm A : X n → R|Q| that is (α, β)-accurate for Q can satisfy
(O(1), o(1/n))-differential privacy.
3 Lower Bounds via Fingerprinting Codes
In this section we prove that there exists a simple family of d queries that requires n ≥ Ω˜(√d)
samples for both accuracy and privacy. Specifically, we prove that for the family of 1-way marginals
on d bits, sample complexity Ω˜(
√
d) is required to produce differentially private answers that are
accurate even just to within ±1/3. In contrast, without a privacy guarantee, Θ(log d) samples
from the population are necessary and sufficient to ensure that the answers to these queries on
the database and the population are approximately the same. The best previous lower bound for
(ε, δ)-differential privacy is also O(log d), which follows from the techniques of [DN03, Rot10].
In Section 3.1 we give the relevant background on fingerprinting codes and in Section 3.2 we
prove our lower bounds for 1-way marginals.
3.1 Fingerprinting Codes
Fingerprinting codes were introduced by Boneh and Shaw [BS98] to address the problem of
watermarking digital content. A fingerprinting code is a pair of randomized algorithms (Gen,Trace).
The code generator Gen outputs a codebook C ∈ {0, 1}n×d. Each row ci of C is the codeword of
user i. For a subset of users S ⊆ [n], we use CS ∈ {0, 1}|S|×d to denote the set of codewords of users
in S. The parameter d is called the length of the fingerprinting code.
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The security property of fingerprinting codes asserts that any codeword can be “traced” to a
user i ∈ [n]. Moreover, we require that the fingerprinting code is “fully-collusion-resilient”—even
if any “coalition” of users S ⊆ [n] gets together and “combines” their codewords in any way that
respects certain constraints known as a marking assumption, then the combined codeword c′ can be
traced to a user i ∈ S. That is, there is a tracing algorithm Trace that takes as inputs the codebook
and combined codeword c′ and outputs either a user i ∈ [n] or ⊥, and we require that if c′ satisfies
the constraints, then Trace(C, c′) ∈ S with high probability. Moreover, Trace should accuse an
innocent user, i.e. Trace(C, c′) ∈ [n] \ S, with very low probability. Analogous to the definition of
re-identifiable distributions (Definition 2.10), we allow Gen and Trace to share a common state.5
When designing fingerprinting codes, one tries to make the marking assumption on the combined
codeword as weak as possible.
The basic marking assumption is that each bit of the combined word c′ must match the
corresponding bit for some user in S. Formally, for a codebook C ∈ {0, 1}n×d, and a coalition
S ⊆ [n], we define the set of feasible codewords for CS to be
F (CS) =
{
c′ ∈ {0, 1}d | ∀j ∈ [d], ∃i ∈ S, c′j = cij
}
.
Observe that the combined codeword is only constrained on coordinates j where all users in S agree
on the j-th bit.
We are now ready to formally define a fingerprinting code.
Definition 3.1 (Fingerprinting Codes). For any n, d ∈ N, ξ ∈ (0, 1], a pair of algorithms
(Gen,Trace) is an (n, d)-fingerprinting code with security ξ if Gen outputs a codebook C ∈ {0, 1}n×d
and for every (possibly randomized) adversary AFP , and every coalition S ⊆ [n], if we set
c′ ←R AFP (CS), then
1. Pr [c′ ∈ F (CS) ∧ Trace(C, c′) = ⊥] ≤ ξ,
2. Pr [Trace(C, c′) ∈ [n] \ S] ≤ ξ,
where the probability is taken over the coins of Gen,Trace, and AFP . The algorithms Gen and
Trace may share a common state.
We remark that our proof of Theorem 3.5, showing how to construct re-identifiable distributions
from a fingerprinting codes, will only require collusion resilience against coalitions S of size |S| ≥ n−1.
Our choice to state Definition 3.1 using resilience against arbitrary coalitions is more consistent
with the literature on fingerprinting codes.
Tardos [Tar08] constructed a family of fingerprinting codes with a nearly optimal number of
users n for a given length d.
Theorem 3.2 ([Tar08]). For every d ∈ N, and ξ ∈ [0, 1], there exists an (n, d)-fingerprinting code
with security ξ for
n = n(d, ξ) = Ω˜(
√
d/ log(1/ξ)).
As we will see in the next subsection, fingerprinting codes satisfying Definition 3.1 will imply
lower bounds on the sample complexity for releasing 1-way marginals with (α, 0)-accuracy (accuracy
5As in Definition 2.10, we could model this by having Gen output an additional string aux that is given to Trace.
However, we make the shared state implicit to reduce notational clutter.
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for every query). In order to prove sample-complexity lower bounds for (α, β)-accuracy with β > 0,
we will need fingerprinting codes satisfying a stronger security property. Specifically, we will expand
the feasible set F (CS) to include all codewords that satisfy most feasibility constraints, and require
that even codewords in this expanded set can be traced. Formally, for any β ∈ [0, 1], we define
Fβ(CS) =
{
c′ ∈ {0, 1}d | Pr
j←R[d]
[∃i ∈ S, c′j = cij] ≥ 1− β} .
Observe that F0(CS) = F (CS).
Definition 3.3 (Error-Robust Fingerprinting Codes). For any n, d ∈ N, ξ, β ∈ [0, 1], a pair of
algorithms (Gen,Trace) is an (n, d)-fingerprinting code with security ξ robust to a β fraction of
errors if Gen outputs a codebook C ∈ {0, 1}n×d and for every (possibly randomized) adversary
AFP , and every coalition S ⊆ [n], if we set c′ ←R AFP (CS), then
1. Pr [c′ ∈ Fβ(CS) ∧ Trace(C, c′) = ⊥] ≤ ξ,
2. Pr [Trace(C, c′) ∈ [n] \ S] ≤ ξ,
where the probability is taken over the coins of Gen,Trace, and AFP . The algorithms Gen and
Trace may share a common state.
In Section 6 we show how to construct error-robust fingerprinting codes with a nearly-optimal
number of users that are tolerant to a constant fraction of errors.
Theorem 3.4. For every d ∈ N, and ξ ∈ (0, 1], there exists an (n, d)-fingerprinting code with
security ξ robust to a 1/75 fraction of errors for
n = n(d, ξ) = Ω˜(
√
d/ log(1/ξ)).
Boneh and Naor [BN08] introduced a different notion of fingerprinting codes robust to adversarial
“erasures”. In their definition, the adversary is allowed to output a string in {0, 1, ?}d, and in order
to trace they require that the fraction of ? symbols is bounded away from 1 and that any non-?
symbols respect the basic feasibility constraint. For this definition, constructions with nearly-optimal
length d = O˜(n2), robust to a 1− o(1) fraction of erasures are known [BKM10]. In contrast, our
codes are robust to adversarial “errors.” Robustness to a β fraction of errors can be seen to imply
robustness to nearly a 2β fraction of erasures but the converse is false. Thus for corresponding levels
of robustness our definition is strictly more stringent. Unfortunately we don’t currently know how
to design a code tolerant to a 1/2− o(1) fraction of errors, so our Theorem 3.4 does not subsume
prior results on robust fingerprinting codes.
3.2 Lower Bounds for 1-Way Marginals
We are now ready to state and prove the main result of this section, namely that there is a
distribution on databases D ∈ ({0, 1}d)n, for n = Ω˜(√d), that is re-identifiable from accurate
answers to 1-way marginals.
Theorem 3.5. For every n, d ∈ N, and ξ ∈ [0, 1] if there exists an (n, d)-fingerprinting code with
security ξ, robust to a β fraction of errors, then there exists a distribution on n-row databases
D ∈ ({0, 1}d)n that is (ξ, ξ)-re-identifiable from (1/3, β)-accurate answers to M1,d.
In particular, if ξ = o(1/n), then by Lemma 2.11 there is no algorithm A : ({0, 1}d)n → R|M1,d|
that is (O(1), o(1/n))-differentially private and (1/3, β)-accurate for M1,d.
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By combining Theorem 3.5 with Theorem 3.2 we obtain a sample complexity lower bound for
1-way marginals, and thereby establish Theorem 1.1 in the introduction.
Corollary 3.6. For every d ∈ N, the family of 1-way marginals on {0, 1}d has sample complexity
at least Ω˜(
√
d) for (1/3, 1/75)-accuracy and (O(1), o(1/n))-differential privacy.
Proof of Theorem 3.5. Let (Gen,Trace) be the promised fingerprinting code. We define the re-
identifiable distribution D to simply be the output distribution of the code generator, Gen. And we
define the privacy adversary B to take the answers a = A(D) ∈ [0, 1]|M1,d|, obtain a ∈ {0, 1}|M1,d|
by rounding each entry of a to {0, 1}, run the tracing algorithm Trace on the rounded answers a,
and return its output. The shared state of D and B will be the shared state of Gen and Trace.
Now we will verify that D is (ξ, ξ)-re-identifiable. First, suppose that A(D) outputs answers
a = (aqj )j∈[d] that are (1/3, β)-accurate for 1-way marginals. That is, there is a set G ⊆ [d] such
that |G| ≥ (1− β)d and for every j ∈ G, the answer aqj estimates the fraction of rows having a 1 in
column j to within 1/3. Let aqj be aqj rounded to the nearest value in {0, 1}. Let j be a column
in G. If column j has all 1’s, then aqj ≥ 2/3, and aqj = 1. Similarly, if column j has all 0’s, then
aqj ≤ 1/3, and aqj = 0. Therefore, we have
a is (1/3, β)-accurate =⇒ a ∈ Fβ(D). (1)
By security of the fingerprinting code (Definition 3.3), we have
Pr [a ∈ Fβ(D) ∧ Trace(D, a) = ⊥] ≤ ξ. (2)
Combining (1) and (2) implies that
Pr [A(D) is (1/3, β)-accurate ∧ Trace(D, a) = ⊥] ≤ ξ.
But the event Trace(D, a) = ⊥ is exactly the same as B(D,A(D)) = ⊥, and thus we have established
the first condition necessary for D to be (ξ, ξ)-re-identifiable.
The second condition for re-identifiability follows directly from the soundness of the fingerprinting
code, which asserts that for every adversary AFP , in particular for A, it holds that
Pr [Trace(D,AFP (D−i)) = i] ≤ ξ.
This completes the proof.
Remark 3.7. Corollary 3.6 implies a lower bound of Ω˜(
√
d) for any family Q on a data universe X
in which we can “embed” the 1-way marginals on {0, 1}d in the sense that there exists q1, . . . , qd ∈ Q
such that for every string x ∈ {0, 1}d there is an x′ ∈ {0, 1}d such that (q1(x′), . . . , qd(x′)) = x. (The
maximum such d is actually the VC dimension of X when we view each element x ∈ X as defining
a mapping q 7→ q(x). See Definition 5.1.)
Our proof technique does not directly yield a lower bound with any meaningful dependence on the
accuracy α. Since the privacy adversary B simply runs the tracing algorithm on the rounded answers
it is given, it is not able to leverage subconstant accuracy to gain an advantage in re-identification.
However, Lemma 2.7 lets us generically translate our lower bound for constant accuracy into a
lower bound depending linearly on 1/α. For 1-way marginals, we get an essentially tight sample
complexity lower bound of Ω˜(
√
d/α) for (α, β)-accuracy.
Corollary 3.8. For every d ∈ N, the family of 1-way marginals on {0, 1}d has sample complexity
at least Ω˜(
√
d/α) for (α, 1/75)-accuracy and (O(1), o(1/n))-differential privacy.
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3.2.1 Minimax Lower Bounds for Statistical Inference
Using the additional structure of Tardos’ fingerprinting code, and our robust fingerprinting codes,
we can prove minimax lower bounds for an “inference version” of the problem computing the 1-way
marginals of a product distribution.
For any d ∈ N, and any marginals p = (p1, . . . , pd) ∈ [0, 1]d, let Dp denote the product distribution
over strings x ∈ {0, 1}d where each coordinate xi is an independent draw from a Bernoulli random
variable with mean pi (i.e. xi is set to 1 with probability pi and set to 0 otherwise). We use D⊗np to
denote n independent draws from Dp. We say that a vector q ∈ [0, 1]d is (α, β)-accurate for p if
Pr
i←R[d]
[|qi − pi| ≤ α] ≥ 1− β.
We can now formally define the problem of inferring the marginals p as follows.
Definition 3.9. Let α, β ∈ [0, 1] be parameters. An algorithm A : ({0, 1}d)n → Rd (α, β)-accurately
infers the marginals of a product distribution if for every vector of marginals p ∈ [0, 1]d,
Pr
D←RD⊗np ,A’s coins
[A(D) is (α, β)-accurate for p] ≥ 2/3.
Our lower bound can thus be stated as follows,
Theorem 3.10. Suppose there is a function n = n(d) such that for every d ∈ N, there exists
an algorithm A : ({0, 1}d)n → Rd that satisfies (O(1), o(1/n))-differential privacy and (1/3, 1/75)-
accurately infers the marginals of a product distribution. Then n = Ω˜(
√
d).
Proof Sketch. The proof has the same general structure that we used to prove Theorem 3.5. Here,
we describe additional observations about the structure of the fingerprinting codes used in that
proof (see Section 6 for a description of Tardos’ fingerprinting code) that allow it to carry over to
the inference version of computing 1-way marginals.
First, in Tardos’ (non-robust) fingerprinting code, the codebook D is chosen by first sampling
marginals p ∈ [0, 1]d from an appropriate distribution and then sampling D from D⊗np . The robust
fingerprinting codes we construct in Section 6 also have this property.6 Thus the instances used
to prove Theorem 3.5 indeed consist of independent samples from a product distribution, which is
what the inference problem assumes.
Next, recall that the proof of Theorem 3.5 shows that any string that is (α, β)-accurate for the
1-way marginals of D can be traced successfully. It is moreover the case that any string that is
(α, β)-accurate for the marginals p can also be traced successfully. This is because the rows of D
are sampled independently from Dp, so accuracy for the 1-way marginals of D and accuracy for p
coincide with high probability, at least when n = ω(log d):
Claim 3.11. Let p ∈ [0, 1]d and let D ←R D⊗np . Let a ∈ [0, 1]d denote the exact 1-way marginals of
D. Then for every α, η > 0, and n = Ω(log(d/η)/α2), we have ‖a − p‖∞ ≤ α with probability at
least 1− η over the choice of D.
6To generate a codebook D′ for our robust fingerprinting code, we sample a codebook D from Tardos’ fingerprinting
code and then insert additional columns of all 1’s or all 0’s to D in random locations. Equivalently, we can obtain a
codebook D′ by appending 1’s and 0’s in random locations of p to obtain a vector p′ and then sampling D′ from D⊗np′ .
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We remark that Steinke and Ullman [SU15a] showed that accuracy with respect to the marginals
p actually suffices to trace regardless of the value of n.
These two observations suffice to show that, when n is too small, a differentially private algorithm
cannot be accurate for p with high probability over the choices of both p and D. Thus, for every
differentially private algorithm, there exists some p such that the algorithm is not accurate with
high probability over the choice of D, which means that the algorithm does not accurately infer the
marginals of an arbitrary product distribution.
3.3 Fingerprinting Codes for General Query Families
In this section, we generalize the connection between fingerprinting codes and sample complexity
lower bounds for arbitrary sets of queries. We show that a generalized fingerprinting code with
respect to any family of counting queries Q yields a sample complexity lower bound for Q, which is
analogous to our lower bound for 1-way marginals (Theorem 3.5). We then argue that some type of
fingerprinting code is necessary to prove any sample complexity lower bound by exhibiting a tight
connection between such lower bounds and a weak variant of our generalized fingerprinting codes.
We begin by defining our generalization of fingerprinting codes. Fix a finite data universe X
and a set of counting queries Q over X . A generalized fingerprinting code with respect to the
family Q consists of a pair of randomized algorithms (Gen,Trace). The code generation algorithm
Gen produces a codebook C ∈ X n. Each row ci of C is the codeword corresponding to user i. A
coalition S ⊆ [n] of pirates receives the subset CS = {ci : i ∈ S} of codewords, and produces an
answer vector a ∈ [0, 1]|Q|. We replace the traditional marking condition on the pirates with the
generalized constraint that they output a feasible answer vector. A natural way to define feasibility
for answer vectors is to require a condition similar to (α, β)-accuracy, i.e. an answer vector a is
feasible if |aq − q(CS)| ≤ α for all but a β fraction of queries q ∈ Q. We thus define a generalized
set of feasible answer vectors by
Fα,β(CS) =
{
a ∈ [0, 1]|Q| | Pr
q←RQ
[|aq − q(CS)| ≤ α] ≥ 1− β
}
.
When α = 1− 1/n, the generalized set of feasible answer vectors captures the traditional marking
assumption by rounding each entry of a feasible answer vector to 0 or 1.7
Definition 3.12. A pair of algorithms (Gen,Trace) is an (n,Q)-fingerprinting code for (α, β)-
accuracy with security (γ, ξ) if Gen outputs a codebook C ∈ X n and for every (possibly randomized)
adversary AFP , and every coalition S ⊆ [n] with |S| ≥ n− 1, if we set a←R AFP (CS), then
1. Pr [a ∈ Fα,β(CS) ∧ Trace(C, a) = ⊥] ≤ γ,
2. Pr [Trace(C, a) ∈ [n] \ S] ≤ ξ,
where the probability is taken over the coins of Gen,Trace, and AFP . The algorithms Gen and
Trace may share a common state.
7An equivalent way to view a codebook is as a set of n codewords C ∈ ({0, 1}|Q|)n, where each user’s codeword is
ci = (q(x))q∈Q for some x ∈ X . Notice that the case where Q is the class of 1-way marginals places no constraints on
the structure of a codeword, i.e. a codeword can be any binary string. With this viewpoint, the goal of the pirates is
to output an answer vector a ∈ [0, 1]|Q| with |aq − 1|S|
∑
i∈S(ci)q| ≤ α for all but a β fraction of the queries q ∈ Q.
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The security properties of Definition 3.12 differ from those of an ordinary fingerprinting code in
two ways so as to enable a clean statement of a composition theorem for generalized fingerprinting
codes (Theorem 4.6). First, we use two separate security parameters γ, ξ for the different types
of tracing errors, as in the definition of re-identifiable distributions. Second, security only needs
to hold for coalitions of size n− 1 or n. However, this condition implies security for coalitions of
arbitrary size with an increased false accusation probability of nξ.
As in Theorem 3.5, the existence of a generalized (n,Q)-fingerprinting code implies a sample
complexity lower bound of n for privately releasing answers to Q, with essentially the same proof.
Theorem 3.13. For every n ∈ N and γ, ξ ∈ [0, 1), if there exists an (n,Q)-fingerprinting code for
(α, β)-accuracy with security (γ, ξ), then there exists a distribution on n-row databases D ∈ X n that
is (γ, ξ)-re-identifiable from (α, β)-accurate answers to Q.
In particular, if γ ≤ 1/3 and ξ = o(1/n), then there is no algorithm A : X n → [0, 1]|Q| that is
(O(1), o(1/n))-differentially private and (α, β)-accurate for Q.
We now turn to investigate whether a converse to Theorem 3.13 holds. We show that a sample
complexity lower bound for a family of queries Q is essentially equivalent to the existence of a
weak type of fingerprinting code, where the tracing procedure depends on the family Q and the
tracing error probabilities satisfy certain affine constraint. It remains an interesting open question
to determine the precise relationship between privacy lower bounds and our notion of generalized
fingerprinting codes.
Definition 3.14. A pair of algorithms (Gen,Trace) is an (n,Q)-weak fingerprinting code for (α, β)-
accuracy with security (ε, δ) if Gen outputs a codebook C ∈ X n and for every (possibly randomized)
adversary AFP that outputs a feasible answer vector with probability 2/3, and every coalition
S ⊆ [n] with |S| ≥ n− 1, if we set a←R AFP (CS), then
Pr[Trace(C, a) 6= ⊥] > eεn · Pr[Trace(C, a) ∈ [n] \ S] + δ,
where the probabilities are taken over the coins of Gen, Trace, and AFP . The algorithms Gen and
Trace may share a common state.
That is, we require the false accusation probability Pr[Trace(C, a) ∈ [n] \ S] to be much smaller
than the total probability of accusing any user. Note that a tracing algorithm that accuses a random
user with probability p will falsely accuse a user with probability p/n when |S| = n− 1; however,
this does not satisfy Definition 3.14 because we require the gap between the two probabilities to be
at least a factor of eεn.
Observe that taking ξ < (1 − δ)/2eεn in Definition 3.12 yields an (n,Q)-weak fingerprinting
code with security (ε, δ). However, Definition 3.14 is weaker than Definition 3.12 in a few important
ways. First, security only holds against pirates with a failure probability of at most 1/3. Second,
while Definition 3.12 requires completeness error Pr[Trace(C, a) = ⊥] < ξ, a weak fingerprinting
code allows Pr[Trace(C, a) = ⊥] = 1− o(1) as long as Pr[Trace(C, a) ∈ [n] \ S] is sufficiently small.
The following theorem shows that the existence of an (n,Q)-weak fingerprinting code is essentially
equivalent to a sample complexity lower bound of n against Q.
Theorem 3.15. For every n ∈ N, if there exists an (n,Q)-weak fingerprinting code for (α, β)-
accuracy with security (ε, δ), then there exists a distribution on n-row databases D ∈ X n such that
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no (ε/2, δ/(2eε/2n))-differentially private algorithm A : X n → R|Q| outputs (α, β)-accurate answers
to Q.
Conversely, let ε ≤ 3 and suppose there is no (ε, δ)-differentially private A : X n → R|Q|
that gives (α, β)-accurate answers to Q with probability at least 1/2. Then there exists an (m =
dn/εe,Q)-weak fingerprinting code for (α− α′, β)-accuracy with security (ε/6, δ/(eε/3 + e5ε/6)), for
α′ = O˜(
√
εVC (Q)/n).
Proof. The forward direction follows the ideas of Lemma 2.11 and Theorem 3.5. Suppose for
the sake of contradiction that there exists an (ε′, δ′)-differentially private A : X n → R|Q| that is
(α, β)-accurate for Q. Define a pirate strategy AFP for coalitions of size |S| ≥ n−1 by running A on
its input CS (possibly padded to size n by a junk row). Since A is (α, β)-accurate, with probability
at least 2/3 it produces an answer vector a such that |a − q(CS)| ≤ α for all but a β fraction of
q ∈ Q. Hence, AFP outputs a feasible answer vector with probability 2/3. Define
p = Pr
C←RGen
coins(AFP ),coins(Trace)
[Trace(C,AFP (C)) 6= ⊥].
Then there exists an i∗ such that Pr[Trace(C,AFP (C)) = i∗] ≥ p/n. By differential privacy,
Pr[Trace(C,AFP (C−i∗)) = i∗] ≥ e−ε′ ·
( p
n
− δ′
)
.
On the other hand, by the security of the weak fingerprinting code and differential privacy,
eε · n · Pr[Trace(C,AFP (C−i∗) = i∗] < Pr[Trace(C,AFP (C−i∗) 6= ⊥]− δ
≤ eε′p+ δ′ − δ.
This yields a contradiction whenever ε′ ≤ ε/2 and δ′ ≤ δ/(1 + eε/2n).
We now show the converse direction, i.e. that the high sample complexity of (Q,X ) implies the
existence of a weak fingerprinting code. We begin with a technical lemma which shows that the
high sample complexity of Q also rules out mechanisms that satisfy only a one-sided constraint on
the probability of any event under the replacement of one row:
Lemma 3.16. Let ε ≤ 1/2. Let A be an (α, β)-accurate algorithm for Q on databases D ∈ Xm.
Suppose we have that for all databases D ∈ Xm, all i ∈ [m], and all measurable T ⊆ Range(A) that
Pr
j←R[m]
coins(A)
[A(D−j) ∈ T ] ≤ eε Pr
coins(A)
[A(D−i) ∈ T ] + δ.
Let d = VC (Q) be the VC-dimension of Q and let
α′ =
(
8
m
·
(
ln 24 + d · ln
(
2em
d
)))1/2
+
ε
m
.
Then there exists a (6ε, (e2ε+e5ε)δ)-differentially private algorithm B on databases of size n = dm/εe
that gives (α+ α′, β)-accurate answers to Q on any database D′ ∈ X n with probability at least 1/2 .
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Proof. On input a database D′ ∈ X n, consider the algorithm B′ that samples a random subset D
consisting of m rows from D′ (without replacement) and returns A(D). Then by our hypothesis on
A, for every i ∈ [n] and every measurable T ⊆ Range(B) = Range(A) we have
Pr
j←R[n]
coins(B′)
[B′(D′−j) ∈ T ] ≤ eε Pr
coins(B′)
[B′(D′−i) ∈ T ]+ δ.
On the other hand, a “secrecy-of-the-sample” argument [KLN+11] enables us to obtain the reverse
inequality. For a row k ∈ [n], consider the following two experiments:
Experiment 1: Sample a random subset D of m rows from D′−k.
Experiment 2: Sample j ←R [n], and then sample a random subset D of m rows from D′−j .
Any database D sampleable under Experiment 1 appears with probability 1/
(
n
m
)
, but appears with
probability at least
n−m
n
· 1(n
m
) ≥ (1− ε) · 1(n
m
)
under Experiment 2. Therefore,
Pr
j←R[n]
coins(B)
[B(D′−j) ∈ T ] ≥ e−2ε Pr
coins(B)
[B(D′−k) ∈ T ] .
Combining the two inequalities shows that for every database D′ ∈ X n and every i, k ∈ [n],
Pr
coins(B′)
[B′(D′−k) ∈ T ] ≤ e3ε Pr
coins(B′)
[B′(D′−i) ∈ T ]+ e2εδ.
By Lemma 2.2, the algorithm B(D′1, . . . , D′n−1) = B′(D′1, . . . , D′n−1,⊥) is (6ε, (e2ε+e5ε)δ)-differentially
private.
Finally, uniform convergence of the sampling error of B′ implies that it remains an accurate
algorithm, and hence so is B. In particular, when D is a random sample of m rows from D′ and d
is the VC-dimension of Q, we have [AB09]:
Pr[∃q ∈ Q : |q(D)− q(D′)| > α′] ≤ 4 ·
(
2em
d
)d
· exp
(
−(α
′)2m
8
)
.
Taking α′ as in the theorem statement makes the total failure probability of B at most 1/2.
Now we proceed to complete the proof of Theorem 3.15. Suppose (Q,X ) has sample complexity
greater than n for (α+α′, β)-accuracy (with failure probability 1/2) and (6ε, (e2ε+e5ε)δ)-differential
privacy. By Lemma 3.16, for every (α, β)-accurate mechanism A for Q there exists a database
D ∈ Xm with m = bnεc, a set T , and an index i such that
Pr
j←R[m]
coins(A)
[A(D−j) ∈ T ] > eε Pr
coins(A)
[A(D−i) ∈ T ] + δ. (3)
We now argue that it is without loss of generality to restrict our attention to mechanisms A whose
range is the finite set I
|Q|
m = {0, 12m , 1m , . . . , 1− 12m , 1}|Q|. To see this, note that the exact answer to
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any counting query q on a database D ∈ Xm is in the set {0, 1m , 2m , . . . , 1− 1m , 1}. Therefore, if an
answer a ∈ [0, 1] satisfies |a− q(D)| ≤ α, then the value
a¯ =
1
2m
· (d(a− α)me+ b(a+ α)mc)
is a point in Im that also satisfies |a¯ − q(D)| ≤ α. Thus, we will henceforth assume that the
mechanism’s output lies in this finite range.
We now apply the min-max theorem from game theory (or equivalently, linear programming
duality), to exhibit a fixed distribution on (D,T, i) for which Inequality (3) holds. Specifically,
consider a two-player zero-sum game in which Player 1 chooses a triple (D,T, i), where D ∈ Xm,
T ⊆ I |Q|m , and i ∈ [m], and Player 2 chooses a randomized function A : Xm → I |Q|m that is
(α, β)-accurate for Q. Let the payoff to Player 1 be
Pr
j←R[m]
[A(D−j) ∈ T ]− eεI(A(D−i) ∈ T ).
By inequality (3), the value of this game is greater than δ. So by the min-max theorem there exists
a mixed strategy for Player 1 that achieves a payoff greater than δ against any mixed strategy
for Player 2. (Note that we can apply the min-max theorem because we have assumed that the
mechanism’s output lies in a finite range.) That is, there exists a distribution D over triples (D,T, i)
such that for any randomized algorithm A : Xm → I |Q|m that takes any D to a feasible vector in
Fα,β(D) with probability at least 2/3,
Pr
j←R[m]
coins(A)
(D,T,i)←RD
[A(D−j) ∈ T ] > eε · Pr
coins(A)
(D,T,i)←RD
[A(D−i) ∈ T ] + δ. (4)
Now consider the following code: Gen samples a database D, a set T , and an index i according
to the promised distribution D. The codebook C is (Dpi(1), . . . , Dpi(m)) where pi : [m] → [m] is a
random permutation. On input an answer vector a, the algorithm Trace checks whether a ∈ T . If it
is, then Trace outputs pi(i), and otherwise outputs ⊥.
To analyze the security of this code, fix a coalition S of m− 1 users using a pirate strategy AFP .
Because the codebook is a random permutation of the rows of D, it is equivalent to analyze the
original database D and a random coalition of m− 1 users. Thus the part of the codebook CS given
to the pirates is a random set of m− 1 rows from D, i.e. D−j for a random j ∈ [m] with the junk
row at index j removed. The condition that AFP outputs a feasible answer vector is equivalent
to a = AFP (CS) being an (α, β)-accurate answer vector. Therefore, letting A : Xm → I |Q|m be the
algorithm that runs AFP on its input with the junk row removed, we have
Pr
Gen,Trace,AFP
[Trace(C, a) 6= ⊥] = Pr
coins(AFP )
(D,T,i)←RD,pi
[AFP (CS) ∈ T ] = Pr
j←R[m],coins(A)
(D,T,i)←RD
[A(D−j) ∈ T ].
On the other hand, the probability that Trace outputs the user j not in the coalition is
Pr
Gen,Trace,AFP
[Trace(C, a) = i] = Pr
j←R[m],coins(AFP )
(D,T,i)←RD,pi
[Trace(C, a) = i ∧ j = i]
=
1
m
· Pr
coins(A),(D,T,i)←RD
[A(D−i) ∈ T ],
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because the events {j = i} and {Trace(C, a) = i} are independent. Thus by (4),
Pr[Trace(a) 6= ⊥] > eεm · Pr[Trace(a) ∈ [m] \ S] + δ,
where both probabilities are taken over the coins of Gen,Trace, and AFP .
4 A Composition Theorem for Sample Complexity
In this section we state and prove a composition theorem for sample complexity lower bounds. At a
high-level the composition theorem starts with two pairs, (Q,X ) and (Q′,X ′), for which we know
sample-complexity lower bounds of n and n′ respectively, and attempts to prove a sample-complexity
lower bound of n · n′ for a related family of queries on a related data universe.
Specifically, our sample-complexity lower bound will apply to the “product” of Q and Q′, defined
on X × X ′. We define the product Q∧Q′ to be
Q∧Q′ = {q ∧ q′ : (x, x′) 7→ q(x) ∧ q′(x′) | q ∈ Q, q ∈ Q′}.
Since q, q′ are boolean-valued, their conjunction can also be written q(x)q′(x′).
We now begin to describe how we can prove a sample complexity lower bound for Q ∧ Q′.
First, we describe a certain product operation on databases. Let D ∈ X n, D = (x1, . . . , xn), be a
database. Let D′1, . . . , D′n ∈ (X ′)n
′
where D′i = (x
′
i1, . . . , x
′
in′) be n databases. We define the product
database D∗ = D × (D′1, . . . , D′n) ∈ (X ×X ′)n·n
′
as follows: For every i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . , n′, let
the (i, j)-th row of D∗ be x∗(i,j) = (xi, x
′
ij). Note that we index the rows of D
∗ by (i, j). We will
sometimes refer to D′1, . . . , D′n as the “subdatabases” of D∗.
The key property of these databases is that we can use a query q ∧ q′ ∈ Q ∧Q′ to compute a
“subset-sum” of the vector sq′ = (q
′(D′1), . . . , q′(D′n)) consisting of the answers to q′ on each of the n
subdatabases. That is, for every q ∈ Q and q′ ∈ Q′,
(q ∧ q′)(D∗) = 1
n · n′
n∑
i=1
n′∑
j=1
(q ∧ q′)(x∗(i,j)) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
q(xi)q
′(D′i). (5)
Thus, every approximate answer aq∧q′ to a query q ∧ q′ places a subset-sum constraint on
the vector sq′ . (Namely, aq∧q′ ≈ 1n
∑n
i=1 q(xi)q
′(D′i)) If the database D and family Q are chosen
appropriately, and the answers are sufficiently accurate, then we will be able to reconstruct a good
approximation to sq′ . Indeed, this sort of “reconstruction attack” is the core of many lower bounds
for differential privacy, starting with the work of Dinur and Nissim [DN03]. The setting they consider
is essentially the special case of what we have just described where D′1, . . . , D′n are each just a single
bit (X ′ = {0, 1}, and Q′ contains only the identity query). In Section 5 we will discuss choices of D
and Q that allow for this reconstruction.
We now state the formal notion of reconstruction attack that we want D and Q to satisfy.
Definition 4.1 (Reconstruction Attacks). Let Q be a family of counting queries over a data
universe X . Let n ∈ N and α′, α, β ∈ [0, 1] be parameters. Let D = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X n be a database.
Suppose there is an adversary BD : R|Q| → [0, 1]n with the following property: For every vector
s ∈ [0, 1]n and every sequence a = (aq)q∈Q ∈ R|Q| such that∣∣∣∣∣aq − 1n
n∑
i=1
q(xi)si
∣∣∣∣∣ < α
20
for at least a 1− β fraction of queries q ∈ Q, BD(a) outputs a vector t ∈ [0, 1]n such that
1
n
n∑
i=1
|ti − si| ≤ α′.
Then we say that D ∈ X n enables an α′-reconstruction attack from (α, β)-accurate answers to Q.
A reconstruction attack itself implies a sample-complexity lower bound, as in [DN03]. However,
we show how to obtain stronger sample complexity lower bounds from the reconstruction attack by
applying it to a product database D∗ to obtain accurate answers to queries on its subdatabases. For
each query q′ ∈ Q′, we run the adversary promised by the reconstruction attack on the approximate
answers given to queries of the form (q∧ q′) ∈ Q∧{q′}. As discussed above, answers to these queries
will approximate subset sums of the vector sq′ = (q
′(D′1), . . . , q′(D′n)). When the reconstruction
attack is given these approximate answers, it returns a vector tq′ = (tq′,1, . . . , tq′,n) such that
tq′,i ≈ sq′,i = q′(D′i) on average over i. Running the reconstruction attack for every query q′ gives us
a collection t = (tq′,i)q′∈Q′,i∈[n] where tq′,i ≈ q′(D′i) on average over both q′ and i. By an application
of Markov’s inequality, for most of the subdatabases D′i, we have that tq′,i ≈ q′(D′i) on average over
the choice of q′ ∈ Q′. For each i such that this guarantee holds, another application of Markov’s
inequality shows that for most queries q′ ∈ Q′ we have tq′,i ≈ q′(D′i), which is our definition of
(α, β)-accuracy (later enabling us to apply a re-identification adversary for Q′).
The algorithm we have described for obtaining accurate answers on the subdatabases is formalized
in Figure 1.
Let a = (aq∧q′)q∈Q,q′∈Q′ be an answer vector.
Let BD : R|Q| → [0, 1]n be a reconstruction attack.
For each q′ ∈ Q′
Let (tq′,1, . . . , tq′,n) = BD((aq∧q′)q∈Q)
Output (tq′,i)q′∈Q′,i∈[n].
Figure 1: The reconstruction R∗D(a).
We are now in a position to state the main lemma that enables our composition technique. The
lemma says that if we are given accurate answers to Q∧Q′ on D∗ and the database D ∈ X n enables
a reconstruction attack from accurate answers to Q, then we can obtain accurate answers to Q′ on
most of the subdatabases D′1, . . . , D′n ∈ (X ′)n
′
.
Lemma 4.2. Let D ∈ X n and D′1, . . . , D′n ∈ (X ′)n
′
be databases and D∗ ∈ (X × X ′)n·n′ be as
above. Let a = (aq∧q′)q∈Q,q′∈Q′ ∈ R|Q∧Q′|. Let α′, α, β ∈ [0, 1] be parameters. Suppose that for some
parameter c > 1, the database D enables an α′-reconstruction attack from (α, cβ)-accurate answers
to Q. Then if (tq′,i)q′∈Q′,i∈[n] = R∗D(a) (Figure 1),
a is (α, β)-accurate for Q∧Q′ on D∗
=⇒ Pr
i←R[n]
[
(tq′,i)q′∈Q′ is (6cα′, 2/c)-accurate for Q′ on Di
] ≥ 5/6.
The additional bookkeeping in the proof is to handle the case where a is only accurate for most
queries. In this case the reconstruction attack may fail completely for certain queries q′ ∈ Q′ and
we need to account for this additional source of error.
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Proof of Lemma 4.2. Assume the answer vector a = (aq∧q′)q∈Q,q′∈Q′ is (α, β)-accurate for Q ∧Q′
on D∗ = D × (D′1, . . . , D′n). By assumption, D enables a reconstruction attack BD that succeeds in
reconstructing an approximation to sq′ = (q
′(D′1), . . . , q′(D′n)) when given (α, cβ)-accurate answers
for the family of queries Q∧{q′}. Consider the set of q′ on which the reconstruction attack succeeds,
i.e.
Q′good =
{
q′ | (aq∧q′)q∈Q is (α, cβ)-accurate for Q∧ {q′}
}
.
Since a is (α, β)-accurate, an application of Markov’s inequality shows that
Pr
[
q′ ∈ Q′good
] ≥ 1− 1/c.
Thus, |Q′good | ≥ (1− 1/c)|Q′|.
Recall that, by (5), we can interpret answers to Q ∧ Q′ as subset sums of answers to the
subdatabases, so for every q′ ∈ Q′good ,∣∣∣∣∣aq∧q′ − 1n
n∑
i=1
q(xi)q
′(D′i)
∣∣∣∣∣ < α
for at least a 1− cβ fraction of queries q ∧ q′ ∈ Q ∧ {q′}. Since D enables a reconstruction attack
from (α, cβ)-accurate answers to Q, by Definition 4.1, BD((aq∧q′)q∈Q) recovers a vector tq′ ∈ [0, 1]n
such that
1
n
n∑
i=1
∣∣tq′,i − q′(D′i)∣∣ < α′.
Since this holds for every q′ ∈ Q′good , we have
E
q′←RQ′good ,i←R[n]
[|tq′,i − q′(D′i)|] ≤ α′
=⇒ Pr
i←R[n]
[
E
q′∈Q′good
[|tq′,i − q′(D′i)|] ≤ 6α′
]
≥ 5/6 (Markov)
=⇒ Pr
i←R[n]
[|tq′,i − q′(D′i)| ≤ 6cα′ for at least a 1− 1/c fraction of q′ ∈ Q′good] ≥ 5/6 (Markov)
=⇒ Pr
i←R[n]
[|tq′,i − q′(D′i)| ≤ 6cα′ for at least a 1− 2/c fraction of q′ ∈ Q′] ≥ 5/6
(since |Q′good | ≥ (1− 1/c)|Q′|)
The statement inside the final probability is precisely that (tq′,i)q′∈Q′ is (6cα′, 2/c)-accurate for Q′
on D′i. This completes the proof of the lemma.
We now explain how the main lemma allows us to prove a composition theorem for sample
complexity lower bounds. We start with a query family Q on a database D ∈ X n that enables a
reconstruction attack, and a distribution D′ over databases in (X ′)n′ that is re-identifiable from
answers to a family Q′. We show how to combine these objects to form a re-identifiable distribution
D∗ for queries Q∧Q′ over (X × X ′)n·n′ , yielding a sample complexity lower bound of n · n′.
A sample from D∗ consists of D∗ = D × (D′1, . . . , D′n) where each subdatabase D′i is an
independent sample from from D′. The main lemma above shows that if there is an algorithm A
that is accurate for Q ∧Q′ on D∗, then an adversary can reconstruct accurate answers to Q′ on
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most of the subdatabases D′1, . . . , D′n. Since these subdatabases are drawn from a re-identifiable
distribution, the adversary can the re-identify a member of one of the subdatabases D′i. Since the
identified member of D′i is also a member of D
∗, we will have a re-identification attack against D∗
as well.
We are now ready to formalize our composition theorem.
Theorem 4.3. Let Q be a family of counting queries on X , and let Q′ be a family of counting
queries on X ′. Let γ, ξ, α′, α, β ∈ [0, 1] be parameters. Assume that for some parameters c > 1,
γ, ξ, α′, α, β ∈ [0, 1], the following both hold:
1. There exists a database D ∈ X n that enables an α′-reconstruction attack from (α, cβ)-accurate
answers to Q.
2. There is a distribution D′ on databases D ∈ (X ′)n′ that is (γ, ξ)-re-identifiable from (6cα′, 2/c)-
accurate answers to Q′.
Then there is a distribution on databases D∗ ∈ (X × X ′)n·n′ that is (γ + 1/6, ξ)-re-identifiable from
(α, β)-accurate answers to Q∧Q′.
Proof. Let D = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X n be the database that enables a reconstruction attack (Def-
inition 4.1). Let D′ be the promised re-identifiable distribution on databases D ∈ (X ′)n′ and
B′ : (X ′)n′ × R|Q′| → [n′] ∪ {⊥} be the promised adversary (Definition 2.10).
In Figure 2, we define a distribution D∗ on databases D′ ∈ (X × X ′)n·n′ . In Figure 3, we define
an adversary B∗ : (X × X ′)n·n′ × R|Q∧Q′| for a re-identification attack. The shared state of D∗
and B∗ will be the shared state of D′ and B′. The next two claims show that D∗ satisfies the two
properties necessary to be a (γ + 1/6, ξ)-re-identifiable distribution (Definition 2.10).
Let D = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X n be a database that enables reconstruction.
Let D′ on (X ′)n′ be a re-identifiable distribution.
For i = 1, . . . , n, choose D′i ←R D′ (independently)
Output D∗ = D × (D′1, . . . , D′n) ∈ (X × X ′)n·n
′
Figure 2: The new distribution D∗.
Let D∗ = D × (D′1, . . . , D′n).
Run R∗D(A(D∗)) (Figure 1) to reconstruct a set of approximate answers (tq′,i)q′∈Q′,i∈[n].
Choose a random i←R [n].
Output B′(D′i, (tq′,i)q′∈Q′).
Figure 3: The privacy adversary B∗(D∗,A(D∗)).
Claim 4.4.
Pr
D∗←RD∗
coins(A),coins(B∗)
[
(B∗(D∗,A(D∗)) = ⊥) ∧ (A(D∗) is (α, β)-accurate for Q∧Q′)] ≤ γ + 1/6.
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Proof of Claim 4.4. Assume that A(D∗) is (α, β)-accurate for Q∧Q′. By Lemma 4.2, we have
Pr
i←R[n]
coins(A),coins(B∗)
[
(A(D∗) is (α, β)-accurate for Q∧Q′)
∧((tq′,i)q′∈Q′ is not (6cα′, 2/c)-accurate for Q′ on Di)
]
≤ 1/6. (6)
By construction of B∗,
Pr
D∗←RD∗
[
(B∗(D∗,A(D∗)) = ⊥) ∧ (A(D∗) is (α, β)-accurate for Q∧Q′)]
= Pr
D∗←RD∗
i←R[n]
[
(B′(D′i, (tq′,i)q′∈Q′) = ⊥) ∧ (A(D∗) is (α, β)-accurate for Q∧Q′)
]
≤ Pr
D∗←RD∗
i←R[n]
[
(B′(D′i, (tq′,i)q′∈Q′) = ⊥) ∧ ((tq′,i) is (6cα′, 2/c)-accurate for Q′)
]
+
1
6
(7)
where the last inequality is by (6). Thus, it suffices to prove that
Pr
D∗←RD∗
i←R[n]
[
(B′(D′i, (tq′,i)q′∈Q′) = ⊥) ∧ ((tq′,i) is (6cα′, 2/c)-accurate for Q′)
] ≤ γ (8)
We prove this inequality by giving a reduction to the re-identifiability of D′. Consider the following
sanitizer A′: On input D′ ←R D′, A′ first chooses a random index i∗ ←R [n]. Next, it samples
D′1, . . . , D′i∗−1, D
′
i∗+1, . . . , D
′
n ←R D′ independently, and sets D′i∗ = D′. Finally, it runs A on
D∗ = D×(D′1, . . . , D′n) and then runs the reconstruction attackR∗ to recover answers (tq′,i)q′∈Q′,i∈[n]
and outputs (tq′,i∗)q′∈Q′ .
Notice that since D′1, . . . , D′n are all i.i.d. samples from D′, their joint distribution is independent
of the choice of i∗. Specifically, in the view of B∗, we could have chosen i∗ after seeing its output on
D∗. Therefore, the following random variables are identically distributed:
1. (tq′,i)q′∈Q′ , where (tq′,i)q′∈Q′,i∈[n] is the output of R∗D(A(D∗)) on D∗ ←R D∗, and i←R [n].
2. A′(D′) where D′ ←R D′.
Thus we have
Pr
D∗←RD∗
i←R[n]
[
(B′(D′i, (tq′,i)q′∈Q′) = ⊥) ∧ ((tq′,i) is (6cα′, 2/c)-accurate for Q′)
]
= Pr
D′←RD′
[
(B′(D′,A′(D′)) = ⊥) ∧ (A′(D′) is (6cα′, 2/c)-accurate for Q′)] ≤ γ
where the last inequality follows because D′ is a (γ, ξ)-re-identifiable from (6cα′, 2/c)-accurate
answers to Q′. Thus we have established (8). Combining (7) and (8) completes the proof of the
claim.
The next claim follows directly from the definition of B∗ and the fact that D′ is (γ, ξ)-re-
identifiable.
Claim 4.5. For every (i, j) ∈ [n]× [n′],
Pr
D←RD∗
[B∗(D,A(D−(i,j))) = (i, j)] ≤ ξ.
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Combining Claims 4.4 and 4.5 suffices to prove that D∗ is (γ + 1/6, ξ)-re-identifiable from
(α, β)-accurate answers to Q∧Q′, completing the proof of the theorem.
The proof of Theorem 4.3 also yields a composition theorem for generalized fingerprinting codes.
Specifically, Theorem 4.6 below shows how to combine a reconstruction attack for a query family Q
on a database D ∈ X n with a (n′,Q′)-generalized fingerprinting code to obtain a (n · n′,Q ∧Q′)-
generalized fingerprinting code.
Theorem 4.6. Let Q be a family of counting queries on X , and let Q′ be a family of counting
queries on X ′. Let γ, ξ, α′, α, β ∈ [0, 1] be parameters. Assume that for some parameters c > 1,
γ, ξ, α′, α, β ∈ [0, 1], the following both hold:
1. There exists a database D ∈ X n that enables an α′-reconstruction attack from (α, cβ)-accurate
answers to Q.
2. There exists a (n′,Q′)-generalized fingerprinting code for (6cα′, 2/c)-accuracy with security
(γ, ξ).
Then there is a (n · n′,Q ∧ Q′)-generalized fingerprinting code for (α, β)-accuracy with security
(γ + 1/6, ξ).
5 Applications of the Composition Theorem
In this section we show how to use our composition theorem (Section 4) to combine our new lower
bounds for 1-way marginal queries from Section 3 with (variants of) known lower bounds from the
literature to obtain our main results. In Section 5.1 we prove a lower bound for k-way marginal
queries when α is not too small (at least inverse polynomial in d), thereby proving Theorem 1.2
in the introduction. Then in Section 5.2 we obtain a similar lower bound for arbitrary counting
queries that allows α to take a wider range of parameters..
5.1 Lower Bounds for k-Way Marginals
In this section, we carry out the composition of sample complexity lower bounds for k-way marginals
as described in the introduction (Theorem 1.2). Recall that we obtain our new Ω˜(k
√
d/α2) lower
bound by combining three lower bounds:
1. Our re-identification based Ω˜(
√
d) lower bound for 1-way marginals (Section 3.2),
2. A known reconstruction-based lower bound of Ω(k) for k-way marginals.
3. A known reconstruction-based lower bound of Ω(1/α2) for k-way marginals.
The lower bound of Ω(k) for k-way marginals is a special case of a lower bound of Ω(VC (Q)) due
to [Rot10] and based on [DN03], where VC (Q) is the Vapnik-Chervonenkis (VC) dimension of Q.
The lower bound of Ω(1/α2) for k-way marginals is due to [KRSU10, De12].
To apply our composition theorem, we need to formulate these reconstruction attack in the
language of Definition 4.1. In particular, we observe that these reconstruction attacks readily
generalize to allow us to reconstruct fractional vectors s ∈ [0, 1]n, instead of just boolean vectors as
in [DN03, Rot10].
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5.1.1 The Ω(k) Lower Bound
First we state and prove that the linear dependence on k is necessary.
Definition 5.1 (VC Dimension of Counting Queries). Let Q be a collection of counting queries over
a data universe X . We say a set {x1, . . . , xk} ⊆ X is shattered by Q if for every string v ∈ {0, 1}k,
there exists a query q ∈ Q such that (q(x1), . . . , q(xk)) = (v1, . . . , vk). The VC-Dimension of Q
denoted VC (Q) is the cardinality of the largest subset of X that is shattered by Q.
Fact 5.2. The set of k-way conjunctions Mk,d over any data universe {0, 1}d with d ≥ k has
VC-dimension VC (Mk,d) ≥ k.8
Proof. For each i = 1, . . . , k, let xi = (1, 1, . . . , 0, . . . , 1) where the zero is at the i-th index. We
will show that {x1, . . . , xk} is shattered by Mk,d. For a string v ∈ {0, 1}k, let the query qv(x)
take the conjunction of the bits of x at indices set to 0 in v. Then qv(xi) = 1 iff vi = 1, so
(qv(x1), . . . , qv(xk)) = (v1, . . . , vk).
Lemma 5.3 (Variant of [DN03, Rot10]). Let Q be a collection of counting queries over a data
universe X and let n = VC (Q). Then there is a database D ∈ X n which enables a 4α-reconstruction
attack from (α, 0)-accurate answers to Q.
Proof. Let {x1, . . . , xn} be shattered by Q, and consider the database D = (x1, . . . , xn). Let
s ∈ [0, 1]n be an arbitrary string to be reconstructed and let a = (aq)q∈Q be (α, 0)-accurate answers.
That is, for every q ∈ Q ∣∣∣∣∣aq − 1n
n∑
i=1
q(xi)si
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ α
Consider the brute-force reconstruction attack B defined in Figure 4. Notice that, since a is (α, 0)-
accurate, B always finds a suitable vector t. Namely, the original database s satisfies the constraints.
We will show that the reconstructed vector t satisfies
Input: Queries Q, and (aq)q∈Q that are (α, 0)-accurate for s.
Find any t ∈ [0, 1]n such that∣∣∣∣∣aq − 1n
n∑
i=1
q(xi)ti
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ α ∀q ∈ Q.
Output: t.
Figure 4: The reconstruction adversary B(D, a).
1
n
n∑
i=1
|ti − si| ≤ 4α.
8More precisely, VC (Mk,d) ≥ k log2(bd/kc), but we use the simpler bound VC (Mk,d) ≥ k to simplify calculation,
since our ultimate lower bounds are already suboptimal by polylog(d) factors for other reasons.
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Let T be the set of coordinates on which ti > si and let S be the set of coordinates where si > ti.
Note that
n∑
i=1
|ti − si| =
∑
i∈T
(ti − si) +
∑
i∈S
(si − ti).
We will show that absolute values of the sums over T and S are each at most 2α. Since {x1, . . . , xn}
is shattered by Q, there is a query q ∈ Q such that q(xi) = 1 iff i ∈ T . Therefore, by the definitions
of t and (α, 0)-accuracy,∣∣∣∣∣aq − 1n
n∑
i=1
q(xi)ti
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣aq − 1n∑
i∈T
ti
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ α and
∣∣∣∣∣aq − 1n∑
i∈T
si
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ α,
so by the triangle inequality, 1n
∑
i∈T (ti − si) ≤ 2α. An identical argument shows that 1n
∑
i∈S(si −
ti) ≤ 2α, proving that t is an accurate reconstruction.
5.1.2 The Ω(1/α2) Lower Bound for k-Way Marginals
We can now state in our terminology the lower bound of De from [De12] (building on [KRSU10])
showing that the inverse-quadratic dependence on α is necessary.
Theorem 5.4 (Restatement of [De12]). Let k be any constant, d ≥ k be any integer, and let
α ≥ 1/d.499k be a sufficiently small parameter9 (i.e. bounded by an absolute constant). There exists
a constant β = β(k) > 0 such that for every α′ > 0, there exists a database D ∈ ({0, 1}d)n with
n = Ωα′,k(1/α
2) such that D enables an α′-reconstruction attack from (α, β)-accurate answers to
the k-way marginals Mk,d.
Although the above theorem is a simple extension of De’s lower bound, we sketch a proof for
completeness, and refer the interested reader to [De12] for a more detailed analysis.
Proof Sketch. The reconstruction attack uses the “`1-minimization” algorithm, which is shown in
Figure 5. To prove that the reconstruction attack succeeds, we will show that there exists a database
Input: Queries Q, D = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1}n×d, and a = (aq)q∈Q.
Let t ∈ [0, 1]n be
arg min
t∈[0,1]n
∑
q∈Q
∣∣∣∣∣aq − 1n
n∑
i=1
q(xi)ti
∣∣∣∣∣
Output: t.
Figure 5: The reconstruction adversary BQ(D, a).
D = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1}n×d such that for any s ∈ [0, 1]n, if a satisfies
Pr
q∈Mk,d
[∣∣∣∣∣aq − 1n
n∑
i=1
q(xi)si
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ α
]
≥ 1− β,
9The constant .499 was chosen for simplicity, and can be replaced with any constant strictly smaller than .5.
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(i.e. a has (α, β)-accurate answers) then BMk,d(D, a) returns a vector t such that ‖t− s‖1 ≤ α′ · n.
Henceforth we refer to such an a simply as (α, β)-accurate for Mk,d on (D, s), as a shorthand. The
above guarantee must hold for suitable choices of n, β, and α′ to satisfy the theorem.
We will argue that the reconstruction succeeds in two steps. First, we show that reconstruction
succeeds if D is “nice.” Second, we show that there exists “nice” D that has the dimensions promised
by the theorem.
To explain what we mean by a “nice” database D, for any D = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1}n×d and
family of queries Q on {0, 1}d, we define the matrix M = MD,Q ∈ {0, 1}n×|Q|, as M(i, q) = q(xi).
De analyzes this reconstruction attack in terms of certain properties of the matrix M. Before
stating the conclusion, we will need to define the notion of a Euclidean section. Informally, a matrix
M is a Euclidean Section if its rowspace10 contains only vectors that are “spread out.”
Definition 5.5 (Euclidean Section). A matrix M ∈ {0, 1}n×m is a δ-Euclidean section if for every
vector a in the rowspace of M we have
√
m · ‖a‖2 ≥ ‖a‖1 ≥ δ
√
m · ‖a‖2.
Lemma 5.6 ([De12]). Let D be a database and Q be a set of queries such that MD,Q ∈ {0, 1}n×|Q|
is a δ-Euclidean section and the least singular value of MD,Q is σ. Let s ∈ [0, 1]n be arbitrary. There
exists β = β(δ) > 0 such that if a are (α, β)-accurate answers for Q on (D, s), and t = BQ(D, a),
then t satisfies
‖s− t‖1 ≤ γn
for γ = O(α
√
n|Q|/σ). The constant hidden in the O(·) notation depends only on δ.
Thus, it suffices to find database D such that the matrix MD,Mk,d is a Euclidean section (for
some fixed constant δ > 0) and has no “small” singular values. A result of Rudelson [Rud12]
(strengthening that of Kasiviswanathan et al. [KRSU10]) guarantees that such a database exists.
Lemma 5.7 ([Rud12]). Let k ∈ N be any constant. Let d, n ∈ N be such that dk ≥ n log n. Let
D ∈ {0, 1}n×d be a uniform random matrix. Then with probability at least 9/10, the matrix MD,Mk,d
defined above has least singular value at least σ = Ω(dk/2) (where the hidden constant in the Ω(·)
may depend on k) and is a δ-Euclidean section for some constant δ > 0 that depends only on k.11
In particular, there exists a database D ∈ {0, 1}n×d such that the Hadamard product M satisfies
the two properties above.
Using the above lemma, we can now complete the proof. Fix any constant k ∈ N. Let α, d, n
be any parameters such that d ≥ k, α ≥ 1/d.499k, and dk ≥ n log n. The precise value of n will be
determined later. Let D ∈ {0, 1}n×d be the database promised by Lemma 5.7. Let β = β(k) > 0 be
a parameter to be chosen later. Let α′ > 0 be the desired accuracy of the reconstruction attack.
Now fix any s ∈ [0, 1]n and let a ∈ [0, 1]|Mk,d| be (α, β)-accurate answers to Mk,d on (D, s).
Now, if we let t = BMk,d(D, a), by Lemma 5.6, provided that β is smaller than some constant that
depends only on δ, which in turn depends only on k, we will have ‖s− t‖1 ≤ γ · n for
γ = O
(
α
√
n|Q|
σ
)
= O
(
α
√
n(d/k)k/2
dk/2
)
= O(α
√
n).
10For a matrix M with rows M1, . . . ,Mn, the rowspace of M is
{
a =
∑n
i=1 ciMi | c1, . . . , cn ∈ R
}
.
11Rudelson actually proves these statements about a related matrix MD,Q where Q ⊆Mk,d. Since, for the Q he
considers, |Q| ≥ |Mk,d|/(2k)k, these statements can easily be seen to hold for the matrix MD,Mk,d itself. Specifically,
adding this many more columns to the matrix MD,Q cannot decrease its least singular value (since MD,Q already has
more columns than rows), and can only decrease the Euclidean section parameter δ by a factor of at most (2k)k.
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Note that by Lemma 5.6, the hidden constant in the O(·) notation depends only on the parameter
δ such that MD,Mk,d is a δ-Euclidean section. By Lemma 5.7, the parameter δ depends only on k.
Thus γ = O(α
√
n) where the hidden constant depends only on k. Now, we can choose n = Ω(1/α2)
such that γ ≤ α′. The hidden constant in the Ω(·) will depend only on k and α′, as required by
the theorem. Note that, since we have assumed α ≥ 1/d.499k, we have n log n = O˜(d.998k), and so
we can define n = Ωk,α′(1/α
2) while ensuring that dk ≥ n log n. Similarly, we required that β is
smaller than some constant that depends only on δ, which in turn depends only on k. Thus, we can
set β = β(k) > 0 to be some sufficiently small constant depending only on k, as required by the
theorem. This completes our sketch of the proof.
5.1.3 Putting Together the Lower Bound
Now we show how to combine the various attacks to prove Theorem 1.2 in the introduction. We
obtain our lower bound by applying two rounds of composition. In the first round, we compose
the reconstruction attack of Theorem 5.4 described above with the re-identifiable distribution for
1-way marginals. We then take the resulting re-identifiable distribution and apply a second round
of composition using the reconstruction attack based on the VC-dimension of k-way marginals.
We remark that it is necessary to apply the two rounds of composition in this order. In particular,
we cannot prove Theorem 1.3 by composing first with the VC-dimension-based reconstruction attack.
Our composition theorem requires a re-identifiable distribution from (α, β)-accurate answers for
β > 0, whereas the reconstruction attack described in Lemma 5.3 requires (α, 0)-accurate answers,
and the reconstruction can fail if some queries have error much larger than α. The resulting
re-identifiable distribution obtained from composing with this reconstruction attack will also require
(α, 0)-accurate answers, and thus cannot be composed further.
This limitation of Lemma 5.3 is inherent, because a sample complexity upper bound of O˜(
√
d/α2)
can be achieved for answering any family of queries Q with (α, β)-accuracy (for any constant β > 0).
Notice that this sample complexity is independent of VC (Q).
We can now formally state and prove our sample-complexity lower bound for k-way marginals,
thereby establishing Theorem 1.3 in the introduction.
Theorem 5.8. For every constant ` ∈ N, every k, d ∈ N, `+ 2 ≤ k ≤ d, and every sufficiently small
(i.e. bounded by an absolute constant) α ≥ 1/d.499`, there is an
n = n(k, d, α) = Ω˜
(
k
√
d
α2
)
such that there exists a distribution on n-row databases D ∈ ({0, 1}d)n that is (1/2, o(1/n))-re-
identifiable from (α, 0)-accurate answers to the k-way marginals Mk,d.
Proof. We begin with the following two attacks:
1. By combining Theorem 3.5 and Theorem 3.4, there exists a distribution on databases D′ ∈
({0, 1}d/3)nd that is (γ = 1/6, ξ = o(1/ndnαnk))-re-identifiable from (6cα′ = 1/3, 2/c = 1/75)
accurate answers to the 1-way marginals M1,d/3 for nd = Ω˜(
√
d/ log(ndnαnk)). Here nα and
nk are set below (the subscript corresponds to the primary parameter that each of the n’s will
depend on).
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2. By Theorem 5.4 (with α′ = 1/2700 and k = `), there is a constant β > 0 such that for any
7200α/β ≥ 1/d.499` there exists a database D ∈ ({0, 1}d/3)nα , for nα = Ω˜(1/α2) that enables
a (1/2700)-reconstruction attack from (7200α/β, β)-accurate answers to M`,d/3.
Applying Theorem 4.3 (with parameter c = 150), we obtain item 1’ below. We then bring in another
reconstruction attack for the composition theorem.
1’. There exists a distribution on databases in ({0, 1}2d/3)ndnα that is (1/3, o(1/ndnαnk))-re-
identifiable from (6c′α′ = 7200α/β, 2/c′ = β/150)-accurate answers to M`,d/3 ∧M1,d/3 ⊂
M`+1,2d/3 (By applying Theorem 4.3 to 1 and 2 above.)
2’. By Lemma 5.3 and Fact 5.2, there exists a database D ∈ ({0, 1}d/3)nk , for nk = k− `− 1, that
enables an (α′ = 4α)-reconstruction attack from (α, 0)-accurate answers to the (k− `− 1)-way
marginals Mk−`−1,d/3. Note that (k − `− 1) ≥ 1, since we have assumed k ≥ `+ 2.
We can then apply Theorem 4.3 to 1’ and 2’ (with parameter c′ = 300/β). Thereby we obtain a
distribution D on databases D ∈ ({0, 1}d/3×{0, 1}d/3×{0, 1}d/3)ndnαnk that is (1/2, ξ)-re-identifiable
from (α, 0)-accurate answers to Mk−`−1,d/3 ∧M`,d/3 ∧M1,d/3 ⊂Mk,d.
To complete the theorem, first note that (α, 0)-accurate answers to Mk,d imply (α, 0)-accurate
answers to any subset of Mk,d. So our lower bound for the subset Mk−`−1,d/3 ∧M`,d/3 ∧M1,d/3 is
sufficient to obtain the desired lower bound. Finally, note that
n = ndnαnk = Ω˜
(
k
√
d
α2
)
,
as desired. This completes the proof.
Using the composition Theorem 4.6 in place of Theorem 4.3, we obtain a version of Theorem 5.8
in the language of generalized fingerprinting codes.
Theorem 5.9. For every constant ` ∈ N, every k, d ∈ N, `+ 2 ≤ k ≤ d, and every sufficiently small
(i.e. bounded by an absolute constant) α ≥ 1/d.499`, there is an
n = n(k, d, α) = Ω˜
(
k
√
d
α2
)
such that there exists a (n,Mk,d)-generalized fingerprinting code with security (1/2, o(1/n)) for
(α, 0)-accuracy.
5.1.4 A Tight Lower Bound for 2-Way Marginals
Theorem 5.8 does not give any non-trivial lower bound for 2-way marginals. Intuitively, the problem
is that the proof uses two rounds of composition, and thus if we try to instantiate the proof for
2-way marginals, one of the three lower bounds being composed will have to be trivial (i.e. will be a
lower bound for 0-way marginals). However, a simple modification of the proof yields a tight lower
bound for 2-way marginals that holds even for (α, β)-accuracy.
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Theorem 5.10. For every k, d ∈ N, and every sufficiently small (i.e. bounded by an absolute
constant) α ≥ 1/d.499, there is a constant β > 0 and an
n = n(d, α) = Ω˜
(√
d/α2
)
such that there exists a distribution on n-row databases D ∈ ({0, 1}d)n that is (1/2, o(1/n))-re-
identifiable from (α, β)-accurate answers to the 2-way marginals M2,d.
Proof. We begin with the following two attacks:
1. By combining Theorem 3.5 and Theorem 3.4, there exists a distribution on databases D′ ∈
({0, 1}d/2)nd that is (γ = 1/6, ξ = o(1/ndnα))-re-identifiable from (6cα′ = 1/3, 2/c = 1/75)
accurate answers to the 1-way marginals M1,d/2 for nd = Ω˜(
√
d/ log(ndnα)). nα is set below.
2. By Theorem 5.4 (with α′ = 1/2700 and k = 1), there is a constant β > 0 such that for any
2700α/β ≥ 1/d.499 there exists a database D ∈ ({0, 1}d/2)nα , for nα = Ω˜(1/α2) that enables a
(1/2700)-reconstruction attack from (2700α, 600β)-accurate answers to M1,d/2.
Applying Theorem 4.3 (with parameter c = 150), we obtain the following: There exists a distribution
on databases in ({0, 1}d)ndnα that is (1/3, o(1/ndnα))-re-identifiable from (α, 4β)-accurate answers
to M1,d/2 ∧M1,d/2 ⊂M2,d.
To complete the theorem, note thatM1,d/2∧M1,d/2 contains exactly 1/4 of all the queries inM2,d,
so (α, β)-accurate answers to M2,d contain (α, 4β)-accurate answers to the subset M1,d/2 ∧M1,d/2.
So our lower bound for the subset M1,d/2 ∧M1,d/2 is sufficient to obtain the desired lower bound.
Finally, note that
n = ndnα = Ω˜
(√
d/α2
)
,
as desired. This completes the proof.
5.2 Lower Bounds for Arbitrary Queries
Using our composition theorem, we can also prove a nearly-optimal sample complexity lower bound
as a function of the |Q|, d, and α and establish Theorem 1.3 in the introduction.
As was the case in the previous section, the main result of this section will follow from three lower
bounds: the Ω˜(
√
d) lower bound for 1-way marginals and the Ω(VC (Q)) bound that we have already
discussed, a lower bound of Ω(1/α2) for worst-case queries, which is a simple variant of the seminal
reconstruction attack of Dinur and Nissim [DN03], and related attacks such as [DMT07, DY08].
Although we already proved a Ω(1/α2) lower bound for the simpler family of k-way marginals in the
previous section, the lower bound in this section will hold for a much wider range of α than what is
known for k-way marginals (roughly α ≥ 2−d for arbitrary queries, whereas for k-way marginals we
require α ≥ 1/d` for some constant `).
5.2.1 The Ω(1/α2) Lower Bound for Arbitrary Queries
Roughly, the results of [DN03] can be interpreted in our framework as showing that there is an
Ω(1/α2)-row database that enables a 1/100-reconstruction attack from (α, 0)-accurate answers to
some family of queries Q, but only when the vector to be reconstructed is Boolean. That is, the
attack reconstructs a bit vector accurately provided that every query in Q is answered correctly.
Dwork et al. [DMT07, DY08] generalized this attack to only require (α, β)-accuracy for some
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constant β > 0, and we will make use of this extension (although we do not require computational
efficiency, which was a focus of those works). Finally, we need an extension to the case of fractional
vectors s ∈ [0, 1]n, instead of Boolean vectors s ∈ {0, 1}n.
The extension is fairly simple and the proof follows the same outline of the original reconstruction
attack from [DN03]. We are given accurate answers to queries inQ, which we interpret as approximate
“subset-sums” of the vector s ∈ [0, 1]n that we wish to reconstruct. The reconstruction attack will
output any vector t from a discretization {0, 1/m, . . . , (m− 1)/m, 1}n of the unit interval that is
“consistent” with these subset-sums. The main lemma we need is an “elimination lemma” that says
that if ‖t− s‖1 is sufficiently large, then for a random subset T ⊆ [n],
1
n
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i∈T
(ti − si)
∣∣∣∣∣ > 3α
with suitable large constant probability. For m = 1 this lemma can be established via combinatorial
arguments, whereas for the m > 1 case we establish it via the Berry-Esse´en Theorem. The lemma
is used to argue that for every t that is sufficiently far from s, a large fraction of the subset-sum
queries will witness the fact that t is far from s, and ensure that t is not chosen as the output.
First we state and prove the lemma that we just described, and then we will verify that it indeed
leads to a reconstruction attack.
Lemma 5.11. Let κ > 0 be a constant, let α > 0 be a parameter with α ≤ κ2/240, and let
n = 1/576κ2α2. Then for every r ∈ [−1, 1]n such that 1n
∑n
i=1 |ri| > κ, and a randomly chosen
q ⊆ [n],
Pr
q⊆[n]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
∑
i∈q
ri
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > 3α
 ≥ 3
5
.
Proof of Lemma 5.11. Let r be as in the statement of the lemma. Define a random variable
Qi =
{
ri/2 if i ∈ q
−ri/2 if i /∈ q
By construction, we have
1
n
∑
i∈q
ri =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(
Qi +
ri
2
)
,
Thus, ∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
∑
i∈q
ri
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 3α⇐⇒
n∑
i=1
Qi ∈
[
−3αn− 1
2
n∑
i=1
ri, 3αn− 1
2
n∑
i=1
ri
]
.
The condition on the right-hand side says that
∑
iQi is in some interval of width 6αn. Since the
random variables Qi are independent, as q is a randomly chosen subset, we will use the Berry-Esse´en
Theorem (Theorem 5.13) to conclude that this sum does not fall in any interval of this width too
often. Establishing the next claim suffices to prove Lemma 5.11.
Claim 5.12. For any interval I ⊆ R of width 6αn,
Pr
[∑
i
Qi 6∈ I
]
≥ 3
5
.
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Proof of Claim 5.12. We use the Berry-Esse´en Theorem:
Theorem 5.13 (Berry-Esse´en Theorem). Let X1, . . . , Xn be independent random variables such
that E [Xi] = 0,
∑
i E
[
X2i
]
= σ2, and
∑
i E
[|Xi|3] = γ. Let X = (X1 + . . .+Xn)/σ and let Y be a
normal random variable with mean 0 and variance 1. Then,
sup
z,z′∈R
∣∣Pr [X ∈ [z, z′]]− Pr [Y ∈ [z, z′]]∣∣ ≤ 2γ
σ3
.
In order to apply Theorem 5.13 with Xi = Qi, we need to analyze the moments of the random
variables Qi. The following bounds can be verified from the definition of Qi and the assumption
that ‖r‖1 ≥ κn.
1. E [Qi] = 0.
2. σ2 =
∑
i E
[
Q2i
] ≥ κ2n/4.
3. γ =
∑
i E
[|Qi|3] ≤ n8 .
Thus, by Theorem 5.13 we have
sup
z,z′∈R
∣∣∣∣Pr [Q1 + . . .+Qnσ ∈ [z, z′]
]
− Pr [Y ∈ [z, z′]]∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2γσ3 ≤ 2κ3√n ≤ 15 ,
where the final inequality holds because n = 1/576κ2α2 ≥ 100/κ6. It can be verified that for
a standard normal random variable Y , and every interval I ⊂ R of width 1/2, it holds that
Pr [Y 6∈ I] ≥ 4/5. Thus, for every such interval I,
Pr
[
Q1 + . . .+Qn
σ
6∈ I
]
≥ 4
5
− 1
5
=⇒ Pr [Q1 + . . .+Qn 6∈ σI] ≥ 3
5
where σI is an interval of width σ/2. Thus we have obtained that
∑
iQi falls outside of any interval
of width σ/2 with probability at least 3/5. In order to establish the claim, we simply observe that
σ
2
≥ κ
√
n
4
≥ 6αn
when n = 1/576κ2α2. Thus, the probability of falling outside an interval of width 6αn is only larger
than the probability of falling outside an interval of width σ/2.
Establishing Claim 5.12 completes the proof of Lemma 5.11.
Theorem 5.14. Let α′ ∈ (0, 1] be a constant, let α > 0 be a parameter with α ≤ (α′)2/960, and
let n = 1/144(α′)2α2. For any data universe X = {x1, . . . , xn} of size n, there is a set of counting
queries Q over X of size at most O(n log(1/α)) such that the database D = (x1, . . . , xn) enables a
α′-reconstruction attack from (α, 1/3)-accurate answers to Q.
33
Proof. First we will give a reconstruction algorithm B for an arbitrary family of queries. We will
then show that for a random set of queries Q of the appropriate size, the reconstruction attack
succeeds for every s ∈ [0, 1]n with non-zero probability, which implies that there exists a set of
queries satisfying the conclusion of the theorem. We will use the shorthand
〈q, s〉 = 1
n
n∑
i=1
q(xi)si
for vectors s ∈ [0, 1]n.
Input: Queries Q, and (aq)q∈Q that are (α, 1/3)-accurate for s.
Let m = d 1αe
Find any t ∈ {0, 1/m, . . . , (m− 1)/m, 1}n such that
Pr
q←RQ
[|〈q, t〉 − aq| < 2α] > 5
6
.
Output: t.
Figure 6: The reconstruction adversary B.
In order to show that the reconstruction attack B from Figure 5.2.1 succeeds, we must show
that 1n
∑n
i=1 |ti − si| ≤ α′. Let s ∈ [0, 1]n, and let s′ ∈ {0, 1/m, . . . , (m− 1)/m, 1}n be the vector
obtained by rounding each entry of s to the nearest 1/m. Then
1
n
n∑
i=1
|s′i − si| ≤
α
2
≤ α
′
2
,
so it is enough to show that the reconstruction attack outputs a vector close to s′. Observe that the
vector s′ itself satisfies
|〈q, s′〉 − aq| ≤ |〈q, s〉 − aq|+ |〈q, s′ − s〉| ≤ 2α
for any subset-sum query q, so the reconstruction attack always finds some vector t. To show that the
reconstruction is successful, fix any t ∈ {0, 1/m, . . . , (m− 1)/m, 1}n such that 1n
∑n
i=1 |ti−s′i| > α
′
2 . If
we write r = s′−t ∈ {−1, . . . ,−1/m, 0, 1/m, . . . , 1}n, then 1n
∑n
i=1 |ri| > α
′
2 and 〈q, r〉 = 〈q, t〉−〈q, s′〉.
In order to show that no t that is far from s′ can be output by B, we will show that for any
r ∈ {−1, . . . ,−1/m, 0, 1/m, . . . , 1} with 1n
∑n
i=1 |r| > α
′
2 ,
Pr
q←RQ
[|〈q, r〉| > 3α] ≥ 1
2
.
To prove this, we first observe by Lemma 5.11 (setting κ = 12α
′) that for a randomly chosen
query q defined on X ,
Pr
q
[|〈q, r〉| > 3α] ≥ 3
5
.
The lemma applies because 〈q, r〉 = 1n
∑n
i=1 q(xi)ri is a random subset-sum of the entries of r.
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Next, we apply a concentration bound to show that if the set Q of queries is a sufficiently large
random set, then for every vector r the fraction of queries for which |〈q, r〉| is large will be close
to the expected number, which we have just established is at least 3|Q|/5. We use the following
version of the Chernoff bound.
Theorem 5.15 (Chernoff Bound). Let X1, . . . , XN be a sequence of independent random variables
taking values in [0, 1]. If X =
∑N
i=1Xi and µ = E [X], then
Pr [X ≤ µ− ε] ≤ e−2ε2/N .
Consider a set of randomly chosen queries Q. By the above, we have that for every r ∈
{−1, . . . ,−1/m, 0, 1/m, . . . , 1}n such that 1n
∑n
i=1 |r| > α
′
2 ,
E
Q
[|{q ∈ Q | |〈q, r〉| > 3α}|] ≥ 3|Q|
5
.
Since the queries are chosen independently, by the Chernoff bound we have
Pr
Q
[
|{q ∈ Q | |〈q, r〉| > 3α}| ≤ |Q|
2
]
≤ e−|Q|/50.
Thus, we can choose |Q| = O(n logm) to obtain
Pr
Q
[
∃r ∈ {−1, . . . ,−1/m, 0, 1/m, . . . , 1}n , 1
n
n∑
i=1
|ri| > α
′
2
, |{q ∈ Q | |〈q, y〉| > 3α}| ≤ |Q|
2
]
< (2m+ 1)ne−|Q|/50 ≤ 1
2
.
Thus, we have established that there exists a family of queries Q such that for every s, t such
that 1n
∑n
i=1 |ti − si| > α′,
Pr
q←RQ
[|〈q, s〉 − 〈q, t〉| > 3α] ≥ 1
2
.
Moreover, by (α, 1/3)-accuracy, we have
Pr
q←RQ
[|aq − 〈q, s〉| > α] ≤ 1
3
.
Applying a triangle inequality, we can conclude
Pr
q←RQ
[|aq − 〈q, t〉| > 2α] ≥ 1
2
− 1
3
≥ 1
6
,
which implies that t cannot be the output of B. This completes the proof.
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5.2.2 Putting Together the Lower Bound
Now we show how to combine the various attacks to prove Theorem 1.2 in the introduction. We
obtain our lower bound by applying two rounds of composition. In the first round, we compose the
reconstruction attack described above with the re-identifiable distribution for 1-way marginals. We
then take the resulting re-identifiable distribution and apply a second round of composition using
the reconstruction attack for query families of high VC-dimension.
Just like our lower bound for k-way marginal queries, we remark that it is necessary to apply
the two rounds of composition in this order. See Section 5.1.3 for a discussion of this issue.
Theorem 5.16. For all d ∈ N, all sufficiently small (i.e. bounded by an absolute constant) α > 2−d/6,
and all h ≤ 2d/3, there exists a family of queries Q of size O(hd log(1/α)/α2) and an
n = n(h, d, α) = Ω˜
(√
d log h
α2
)
such that there exists a distribution on n-row databases D ∈ ({0, 1}d)n that is (1/2, o(1/n))-re-
identifiable from (α, 0)-accurate answers to Q.
Proof. We begin with the following two attacks:
1. By Theorem 3.5 and Theorem 3.4, there exists a distribution on databases in ({0, 1}d/3)m
that is (1/6, o(1/m` log h))-re-identifiable from (1/3, 1/75) accurate answers to M1,d/3 for
m = Ω˜(
√
d/ log(m` log h)). Here ` and h are parameters we set below.
2. For some ` = Ω(1/α2), by Theorem 5.14, there exists a database D ∈ ({0, 1}d/3)` that
enables a α′-reconstruction attack from (6c′α, 1/3)-accurate answers to some Qrec of size
O((log(1/α))/α2). Here α′ is a constant with 6cα′ = 1/3 for a composition parameter c set
below, and c′ is a constant composition parameter set when we apply the second round of
composition.
Applying Theorem 4.3 (with parameter c = 150), we obtain item 1’ below. We then bring in another
reconstruction attack for the composition theorem.
1’. There exists a distribution on databases in ({0, 1}2d/3)m` that is (1/3, o(1/m` log h))-re-
identifiable from (6c′α, 1/450)-accurate answers to Qrec ∧M1,d/3 (By applying Theorem 4.3
to 1 and 2 above.)
2’. By Lemma 5.3, there exists a database D ∈ ({0, 1}d/3)log h that enables a (4α)-reconstruction
attack from (α, 0)-accurate answers to some Qvc of size h. (In particular, the family of queries
can be all (log h)-way marginals on the first log h bits of the data universe items.)
We can then apply Theorem 4.3 to 1’ and 2’ (with parameter c′ = 900). Thereby we obtain a
distribution D on databases D ∈ ({0, 1}d/3×{0, 1}d/3×{0, 1}d/3)m` log h that is (1/2, ξ)-re-identifiable
from (α, 0)-accurate answers to Q = Qvc ∧Qrec ∧M1,d/3.
To complete the theorem we first set
n = m` log h = Ω˜(
√
d log h/α2).
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and then observe that
|Qvc ∧Qrec ∧M1,d/3| = h ·O(` log(1/α)/α2) · d/3 = O(hd log(1/α)/α2).
This completes the proof.
Again, Theorem has a corresponding statement in terms of generalized fingerprinting codes.
Theorem 5.17. For all d ∈ N, all sufficiently small (i.e. bounded by an absolute constant)
α > 2−d/6, and all h ≤ 2d/3, there exists a family of queries Q of size O(hd log(1/α)/α2) and an
n = n(h, d, α) = Ω˜
(√
d log h
α2
)
such that there exists a (n,Q)-generalized fingerprinting code with security (1/2, o(1/n)) for (α, 0)-
accuracy.
6 Constructing Error-Robust Fingerprinting Codes
In this section, we show how to construct fingerprinting codes that are robust to a constant fraction
of errors, which will establish Theorem 3.4. Our codes are based on the fingerprinting code of
Tardos [Tar08], which has a nearly optimal number of users, but is not robust to any constant
fraction of errors. The number of users in our code is only a constant factor smaller than that of
Tardos, and thus our codes also have a nearly optimal number of users.
To motivate our approach, it is useful to see why the Tardos code (and all other fingerprinting
codes we are aware of) are not robust to a constant fraction of errors. The reason is that the the
only way to introduce an error is to put a 0 in a column containing only 1’s or vice versa (recall
that the set of codewords, C ∈ {0, 1}n×d, can be viewed as an n× d matrix). We call such columns
“marked columns.” Thus, if the adversary is allowed to introduce ≥ m errors where m is the number
of marked columns then he can simply ignore the codewords and output either the all-0 or all-1
codeword, which cannot be traced. Thus, in order to tolerate a β fraction of errors, it is necessary
that m ≥ βd where d is the length of the codeword, and this is not satisfied by any construction we
know of (when β > 0 is a constant). However, Tardos’ construction can be shown to remain secure
if the adversary is allowed to introduce βm errors, rather than βd errors, for some constant β > 0.
We demonstrate this formally in Section 6.2. In addition, we show how to take a fingerprinting code
that tolerates βm errors and modify it so that it can tolerate about βd/3 errors. This reduction is
formalized in Section 6.1. Combining these two results will give us a robust fingerprinting code.
We remark that prior work [BN08, BKM10] has shown how to construct fingerprinting codes
satisfying a weaker robustness property. Specifically, their codes allow the adversary to introduce a
special “?” symbol in a large fraction of coordinates, but still require that any coordinate that is
not a “?” satisfies the feasibility constraint.
Before proceeding with the construction and analysis, we restate some terminology and notation
from Section 3. Recall that a fingerprinting code is a pair of algorithms (Gen,Trace), where Gen
specifies a distribution over codebooks C ∈ {0, 1}n×d consiting of n codewords (c1, . . . , cn), and
Trace(C, c′) either outputs the identity i ∈ [n] of an accused user or outputs ⊥. Recall that Gen
and Trace share a common state. For a coalition S ⊆ [n], we write CS ∈ {0, 1}|S|×d to denote the
subset of codewords belonging to users in S.
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Every codebook C, coalition S, and robustness parameter β ∈ [0, 1] defines a feasible set of
combined codewords,
Fβ(CS) =
{
c′ ∈ {0, 1}d | Pr
j←R[d]
[∃i ∈ S, c′j = cij] ≥ 1− β} .
We now recall the definition of an error-robust fingerprinting code from Section 3.1.
Definition 6.1 (Error-Robust Fingerprinting Codes (Restatement of Definition 3.3)). For any
n, d ∈ N, ξ, β ∈ [0, 1], a pair of algorithms (Gen,Trace) is an (n, d)-fingerprinting code with security
ξ robust to a β fraction of errors if Gen outputs a codebook C ∈ {0, 1}n×d and for every (possibly
randomized) adversary AFP , and every coalition S ⊆ [n], if we set c′ ←R AFP (CS), then
1. Pr [(Trace(C, c′) = ⊥) ∧ (c′ ∈ Fβ(CS))] ≤ ξ,
2. Pr [Trace(C, c′) ∈ [n] \ S] ≤ ξ,
where the probability is taken over the coins of Gen,Trace, and AFP . The algorithms Gen and
Trace may share a common state.
The main result of this section is a construction of fingerprinting codes satisfying Definition 6.1
Theorem 6.2 (Restated from Section 3.1). For every n ∈ N and ξ ∈ (0, 1], there exists an (n, d)
fingerprinting code with security ξ robust to a 1/75 fraction of errors for
d = d(n, ξ) = O˜(n2 log(1/ξ)).
Equivalently, for every d ∈ N, and ξ ∈ (0, 1], there exists an (n, d)-fingerprinting code with security
ξ robust to a 1/75 fraction of errors for
n = n(d, ξ) = Ω˜(
√
d/ log(1/ξ)).
We remark that we have made no attempt to optimize the fraction of errors to which our code
is robust. We leave it as an interesting open problem to construct a robust fingerprinting code for a
nearly-optimal number of users that is robust to a fraction of errors arbitrarily close to 1/2.
6.1 From Weak Error Robustness to Strong Error Robustness
A key step in our construction is a reduction from constructing error-robust fingerprinting codes to
constructing a weaker object, which we call a weakly-robust fingerprinting code. The difference
between a weakly-robust fingerprinting code and an error-robust fingerprinting code of the previous
section is that we now demand that only a β fraction of the marked positions can have errors, rather
than a β fraction of all positions.
In order to formally define weakly-robust fingerprinting codes, we introduce some terminology.
If C ∈ {0, 1}n×d is a codebook, then for b ∈ {0, 1}, we say that position j ∈ [d] is b-marked in C if
cij = b for every i ∈ [n]. That is, j is b-marked if every user has the symbol b in the j-th position of
their codeword. The set Fβ(C) consists of all codewords c
′ such that for a 1−β fraction of positions
j, either j is not marked, or j is b-marked and c′j = b. Notice that this constraint is vacuous if fewer
than a β fraction of positions are marked.
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For a weakly-robust fingerprinting code, we will define a more constrained feasible set. Intuitively,
a codeword c′ is feasible if for a 1− β fraction of positions that are marked, c′j is set appropriately.
Note that this condition is meaningful even when the fraction of marked positions is much smaller
than β. More formally, we define
WF β(CS) =
{
c′ ∈ {0, 1}d | Pr
j←R[d]
[
c′j = b | j is b-marked in CS for some b ∈ {0, 1}
] ≥ 1− β} .
Definition 6.3 (Weakly-Robust Fingerprinting Codes). For any n, d ∈ N and ξ, β ∈ [0, 1], a pair of
algorithms (Gen,Trace) is an (n, d)-weakly-robust fingerprinting code with security ξ weakly-robust
to a β fraction of errors if (Gen,Trace) satisfy the conditions of a robust fingerprinting code (for
the same parameters) with WF β in place of Fβ.
The next theorem states that if we have an (n, d)-fingerprinting code that is weakly-robust to a β
fraction of errors and satisfies a mild technical condition, then we obtain an (n,O(d))-fingerprinting
code that is robust to an Ω(β) fraction of errors with a similar level of security.
Lemma 6.4. For any n, d ∈ N, ξ, β ∈ [0, 1], and m ∈ N, suppose there is a pair of algorithms
(Gen,Trace) which
1. are a (n, d)-fingerprinting code with security ξ weakly-robust to a β fraction of errors, and
2. with probability at least 1−ξ over C ←R Gen, produce C that has at least m 0-marked columns
and m 1-marked columns.
Then there is a pair of algorithms (Gen ′,Trace ′) that are a (n, d′)-fingerprinting code with security
ξ′ robust to a β/3 fraction of errors, where
d′ = 5d and ξ′ = ξ + 2 exp
(−Ω(βm2/d)) .
Proof. The reduction is given in Figure 7. Recall that Gen ′ and Trace ′ may share state, so pi and
the shared state of Gen and Trace is known to Trace ′.
Gen ′:
Choose C ←R Gen, C ∈ {0, 1}n×d
Append 2d 0-marked columns and 2d 1-marked columns to C
Apply a random permutation pi to the columns of the augmented codebook
Let the new codebook be C ′ ∈ {0, 1}n×d′ for d′ = 5d
(We refer to the columns from C as real and to the additional columns as fake)
Output C ′
Trace ′(C ′, c′):
Obtain C by applying pi−1 to the columns of C ′ and removing the fake columns
Obtain c by applying pi−1 to c′ and removing the symbols corresponding to fake columns
Output i←R Trace(C, c)
Figure 7: Reducing robustness to weak robustness.
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Fix a coalition S ⊆ [n]. Let A′FP be an adversary. Sample C ′ ←R Gen ′ and let c′ = A′FP (C ′).
We will show that the reduction is successful by proving that if c′ ∈ Fβ/3(C ′), then the modified
string c ∈ WF β(C) with probability 1− exp(−Ω(βm2/d)). The reason is that an adversary who
is given (a subset of the rows of) C ′ cannot distinguish real columns that are marked from fake
columns. Therefore, the fraction of errors in the real marked columns should be close to the fraction
of errors that are either real and marked or fake. Since the total fraction of errors in the entire
codebook is at most β/3, we know that the fraction of errors in real marked columns is not much
larger than β/3. Thus the fraction of errors in the real marked columns will be at most β with high
probability. We formalize this argument in the following claim.
Claim 6.5.
Pr
pi
[
(c′ ∈ Fβ/3(C ′)) ∧ (c ∈WF β(C))
] ≤ 2 exp(−Ω(βm2/d))
Proof of Claim 6.5. Our analysis will handle 0-marked and 1-marked columns separately. Assume
that c′ ∈ Fβ/3(C ′) and that the adversary has introduced k ≤ βd′/3 errors to 0-marked columns.
Let m0 ≥ m be the number of 0-marked columns. Let R0 be a random variable denoting the number
of columns that are both real and 0-marked in which the adversary introduces an error. Since real
0-marked columns are indistinguishable from fake 0-marked columns, R0 has a hypergeometric
distribution on k draws from a population of size N = m0 + 2d with m0 successes. In other words,
we can think of an urn with N balls, m0 of which are labeled “real” and 2d of which are labeled
“fake.” We draw k balls without replacement, and R0 is the number that are labeled “real.” This
distribution has E [R0] = km0/N = km0/(m0 + 2d). Moreover, as shown in [DS01, Section 7.1]), it
satisfies the concentration inequality
Pr[|R0 − E [R0] | > t] ≤ exp
( −2(N − 1)t2
(N − k)(k − 1)
)
≤ exp(−Ω(t2/k))
since k ≤ 5N/6. Thus
Pr[R0 > βm0] ≤ Pr[|R0 − E [R0] | > βm0 − E [R0]]
≤ exp
(
− Ω
(
(βm0 − km0/N)2
k2
))
≤ exp
(
− Ω
(
(βm0)
2(1− d′/6d)2
(βd′/3)2
))
≤ exp
(
− Ω
(
βm20
d
))
for any choice of k. An identical argument bounds the probability that the number of errors in real
1-marked columns is more than βm1. Therefore, the probability that more than a β fraction of
marked columns have errors is at most 2 exp(−Ω(βm2/d)).
Now define an adversary AFP that takes CS as input, simulates Gen ′ by appending marked
columns to CS and applying a random permutation pi, and then applies A′FP to the resulting
codebook C ′S . Then it takes A′FP (C ′S), applies pi−1, removes the fake columns, and outputs the
result. Notice that Trace ′ applies Trace to a codebook and codeword generated by exactly the same
procedure. If we assume that A′FP (C ′S) is feasible with parameter β/3, then by the analysis above,
40
with probability at least 1− ξ − exp(−Ω(βm2/d)), AFP (CS) is weakly feasible with parameter β.
Thus,
Pr
C′←RGen ′
[
(Trace ′(C ′,A′FP (CS)) = ⊥) ∧ (A′FP (CS) ∈ Fβ/3(CS))
]
≤ Pr
C←RGen
[(Trace(C,AFP (CS)) = ⊥ ∧ (AFP (CS) ∈WF β(CS))] + 2 exp(−Ω(βm2/d))
≤ ξ + 2 exp(−Ω(βm2/d)),
where the first inequality is by Claim 6.5 and the second inequality is by ξ-security of Trace.
Since Trace does not accuse a user outside of S (except with probability at most ξ) regardless
of whether or not that adversary’s codeword is feasible, it is immediate that Trace ′ also does not
accuse a user outside of S (except with probability at most ξ).
6.2 Weak Robustness of Tardos’ Fingerprinting Code
In this section we show that Tardos’ fingerprinting code is weakly robust to a β fraction of errors
for β ≥ 1/25. Specifically we prove the following:
Lemma 6.6. For every n ∈ N and ξ ∈ (0, 1], there exists an (n, d) fingerprinting code with security
ξ weakly robust to a 1/25 fraction of errors for
d = d(n, ξ) = O˜(n2 log(1/ξ)).
Equivalently, for every d ∈ N, and ξ ∈ (0, 1], there exists an (n, d)-fingerprinting code with security
ξ weakly robust to a 1/25 fraction of errors for
n = n(d, ξ) = Ω˜(
√
d/ log(1/ξ)).
Tardos’ fingerprinting code is described in Figure 8. Note that the shared state of Gen and
Trace will include p1, . . . , pd.
Tardos’ proof that no user is falsely accused (except with probability ξ) holds for every adversary,
regardless of whether or not the adversary’s output is feasible, therefore it holds without modification
even when we allow the adversary to introduce errors. So we will state the following lemma
from [Tar08, Section 3] without proof.
Lemma 6.7 (Restated from [Tar08]). Let (Gen,Trace) be the fingerprinting code defined in Algo-
rithm 8. Then for every adversary AFP , and every S ⊆ [n],
Pr [Trace(C,AFP (CS)) ∈ [n] \ S] ≤ ξ,
where the probability is taken over the choice of C ←R Gen and the coins of AFP .
Most of the remainder of this section is devoted to proving that any adversary who introduces
errors into at most a 1/25 fraction of the marked columns can be traced successfully.
Lemma 6.8. Let (Gen,Trace) be the fingerprinting code defined in Algorithm 8. Then for every
adversary AFP , and every S ⊆ [n],
Pr
[
(Trace(C,AFP (CS)) = ⊥) ∧ (AFP (CS) ∈WF 1/25(CS))
] ≤ ξ,
where the probability is taken over the choice of C ←R Gen and the coins of AFP .
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Gen:
Let d = 100n2 log(n/ξ) be the length of the code.
Let t = 1/300n be a parameter and let t′ be such that sin2 t′ = t.
For j = 1, . . . , d:
Choose rj ←R [t′, pi/2− t′] and let pj = sin2 rj . Note that pj ∈ [t, 1− t].
For each i = 1, . . . , n, set Cij = 1 with probability pj , independently.
Output C.
Trace(C, c′):
Let Z = 20n log(n/ξ) be a parameter.
For each j = 1, . . . , d, let qj =
√
(1− pj)/pj .
For each j = 1, . . . , d, and each i = 1, . . . , n, let
Uij =
{
qj if Cij = 1
−1/qj if Cij = 0
For each i = 1, . . . , n:
Let
Si(c
′) =
d∑
j=1
c′jUij
If Si(c
′) ≥ Z/2, output i
If Si(c
′) < Z/2 for every i = 1, . . . , n, output ⊥.
Figure 8: The Tardos Fingerprinting Code [Tar08]
Before giving the proof, we briefly give a high-level roadmap. Recall that in the construction
there is a “score” function Si(c
′) that is computed for each user, and Trace will output some user
whose score is larger than the threshold Z/2, if such a user exists. Tardos shows that the sum of
the scores over all users is at least nZ/2, which demonstrates that there exists a user whose score
is above the threshold. His argument works by balancing two contributions to the score: 1) the
contribution from 1-marked columns j, which will always be positive due to the fact that c′j = 1,
and 2) the potentially negative contribution from columns that are not 1-marked. Conceptually, he
shows that the contribution from the 1-marked columns is larger in expectation than the negative
contribution from the other columns, so the expected score is significantly above the threshold. He
then applies a Chernoff-type bound to show that the score will be above the threshold with high
probability. When the adversary is allowed to introduce errors so that there may be some 1-marked
columns j such that c′j = 0, these errors will contribute negatively to the score. The new ingredient
in our argument is essentially to bound the negative contribution from these errors. We are able to
get a sufficiently good bound to tolerate errors in 1/25 of the coordinates. We expect that a tighter
analysis and more careful tuning of the parameters can improve the fraction of errors that can be
tolerated.
Proof of Lemma 6.8. We will write S = [n]. Doing so is without loss of generality as users outside
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of S are irrelevant. We will use β = 1/25 to denote the allowable fraction of errors. Fix an adversary
B. Sample C ←R Gen and let c′ = B(C). Assume c′ ∈WF β(C). In order to prove that some user
is traced, we will bound the quantity
S(c′) =
n∑
i=1
Si(c
′) =
d∑
j=1
c′j
(
xjqj − n− xj
qj
)
where xj =
∑n
i=1Cij is defined to be the number of codewords ci such that cij = 1. Our goal is to
show that this quantity is at least nZ/2 with high probability. If we can do so, then there must
exist a user i ∈ [n] such that Si(c′) ≥ Z/2, in which case Trace(C, c′) 6= ⊥.
We may decompose an output c′ of B(C) into a the sum of a codeword c˜ ∈WF 0(C) with no
errors, and a string c that captures errors introduced into at most a β fraction of the marked
coordinates. Each codeword c has a unique such decomposition if we assume the following constraints
on c.
1. If j is unmarked, then cj = 0.
2. If j is 0-marked, then cj ∈ {0, 1}.
3. If j is 1-marked, then cj ∈ {−1, 0}.
4. The number of nonzero coordinates of c is at most βm, where m is the number of marked
columns of c.
We call a c satisfying the above constraints valid. By the linearity of S(·), we can write
S(c′) = S(c˜) + S(c).
Tardos’ analysis of the error-free case proves that S(c˜) is large. In our language, he proves
Claim 6.9 (Restated from [Tar08]). For every adversary B, if C ←R Gen, c′ ←R B(C), and
c′ = c˜+ c as above, then
Pr [(S(c˜) < nZ) ∧ (c˜ ∈WF 0(C))] ≤ ξ
√
n/4.
Although S(c) will be negative, and thus S(c′) ≤ S(c˜), we will show that S(c) is not too negative.
That is, introducing errors into a β fraction of the marked columns in c′ cannot reduce S(c′) by too
much.
We will now establish the following claim.
Claim 6.10. For any adversary B, if C ←R Gen, c′ ←R B(C), and c′ = c˜+ c as above, then
Pr [(S(c) < −nZ/2) ∧ (c is valid)] ≤ ξ/2.
Proof of Claim 6.10. We start by making an observation about the distribution of S(c) = S(c)|C,c,
which denotes S(c) when we condition on a fixed choice of a codebook C and a valid choice of c.
Because the non-zero coordinates of c are only in marked columns of C (those in which xj = 0 or
xj = n), the distribution of
S(c)|C,c =
d∑
j=1
cj
(
xjqj − n− xj
qj
)
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depends only on the number of non-zero coordinates of c, and not on their location. To see that
this is the case, consider a 0-marked coordinate j on which cj = 1. The contribution of j to S(c) is
exactly −n/qj . Similarly, for a 1-marked coordinate j on which cj = −1, the contribution of j to
S(c) is exactly −nqj . Thus we can write
S(c) =
d∑
j=1
cj
(
xjqj − n− xj
qj
)
= −
 ∑
j∈[d]:j is 0-marked and cj = 1
n/qj +
∑
j∈[d]:j is 1-marked and cj = −1
nqj
 (9)
Each term in the first sum (resp. second sum) is a random variable that depends only on the
distribution of qj conditioned on the the j-th column being 0-marked (resp. 1-marked). Recall
that qj is determined by pj . Moreover, conditioned on a fixed C, the pj ’s are independent. To see
this, let Cj denote the jth column of the codebook C. Recall that each column Cj is generated
independently using pj , and the pj ’s themselves are chosen independently. Letting fX denote the
density function of a random variable X, this means that the joint density
fp1,...,pd(x1, . . . , xd | C1, . . . , Cd) =
Pr[C1, . . . , Cd | x1, . . . , xd]fp1,...,pd(x1, . . . , xd)
Pr[C1, . . . , Cd]
(Bayes’ rule)
=
Pr[C1 | x1]fp1(x1)
Pr[C1]
· . . . · Pr[Cd | xd]fpd(xd)
Pr[Cd]
= fp1(x1 | C1) · . . . · fpd(xd | Cd).
This shows that the conditional random variables pj |Cj are independent. Moreover, since c only
depends on the codebook C and coins of the adversary B, the pj ’s are still independent when we
also condition on c. In fact, the following holds:
Claim 6.11. Conditioned on any fixed choice of C and c, the following distributions are all identical,
independent, and non-negative: 1) (n/qj | j is 0-marked) for j ∈ [d], and 2) (nqj | j is 1-marked).
Proof of Claim 6.11. By the discussion above, we know that these random variables are independent.
To see that they are identicially distributed, note that the distribution pj used to generate the
jth column of C is symmetric about 1/2. Therefore, the probability that column j is 0-marked
when its entries are sampled according to pj is the same as the probability that j is 1-marked when
its entries are sampled according to 1 − pj . Applying Bayes’ rule, again using the fact that pj
and 1− pj have the same distribution, we see that the random variables (pj | j is 0-marked) and
(1− pj | j is 1-marked) are identically distributed. The claim follows since qj =
√
(1− pj)/pj .
In light of this fact, we can see that the conditional random variable S(c)|C,c is a sum of i.i.d.
random variables and the number of these variables in the sum is exactly the number of marked
columns j on which cj is non-zero. For any t ∈ N and any non-negative random variable Q, the sum
of t+ 1 independent draws from Q stochastically dominates12 the sum of t independent draws from
Q. Recall that S(c) will be negative and we want its magnitude not to be too large. Equivalently,
we want the positive sum in (9) not to be too large. Therefore, the “worst-case” for the sum (9) is
12For random variables X and Y over R, X stochastically dominates Y if for every z ∈ R, Pr [X ≥ r] ≥ Pr [Y ≥ r].
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when c has the largest possible number of non-zero coordinates. Recall that the number of non-zero
coordinates of c is exactly the number of errors introduced by the adversary. Thus, the “worst-case”
adversary B∗ is the one that chooses a random set of exactly βm marked columns and for the
chosen columns j that are 0-marked, sets cj = 1 and for those that are 1-marked, sets cj = −1. In
summary, it suffices to consider only the single adversary B∗(C) that constructs a feasible c˜ and
introduces errors in a random set of βm of the marked coordinates in C.
Now we proceed to analyzing B∗. We follow Tardos’ approach to analyzing S. A key step in his
analysis is to show that the optimal adversary (for the error-free case) chooses the j-th coordinate
of c′ based only on the j-th column of C. In our case, the optimal adversary B∗ introduces errors in
a random set of exactly βm marked columns, which does not satisfy this independence condition.
So instead, we will analyze an adversary Bˆ∗ that introduces an error in each marked column
independently with probability β. This adversary may fail to introduce errors in exactly βm random
columns, and thus it is not immediately sufficient to bound Pr [S(c) < −nZ/2] for c′ ←R Bˆ∗(C).
However, a standard analysis of the binomial distribution shows that this adversary introduces
errors in exactly βm marked columns with probability at least
1/2
√
m ≥ 1/2
√
d = 1/poly(n, log(1/ξ)),
and conditioned on having βm errors, those errors occur on a uniformly random set of marked
columns. Thus, if we can show that
Pr
c′←RBˆ∗(C)
[S(c) < −nZ/2] < ξ
√
n/4,
we must also have
Pr
c′←RB∗(C)
[S(c) < −nZ/2] ≤ poly(n, log(1/ξ)) · ξ
√
n/4 ≤ ξ/2,
provided n, 1/ξ are sufficiently large.
For the remainder of the proof, we will show that indeed Pr [S(c) < −nZ/2] < ξ
√
n/4 for
c′ ←R B∗(C). We do so by bounding the quantity Ep,C
[
e−αS
]
for a suitable α > 0 that we will
choose later, and then by applying Markov’s inequality. Note that the expectation is taken over
both the parameters p = (p1, . . . , pd) and the randomness of the adversary.
E
p,C
[
e−αS
]
=
∑
C
E
p
e−αS d∏
j=1
p
xj
j (1− pj)n−xj

=
∑
C
E
p
 d∏
j=1
p
xj
j (1− pj)n−xje
−αcj
(
xjqj−n−xjqj
)
=
∑
C
d∏
j=1
E
p
[
pxj (1− p)n−xje−αcj
(
xjqj−n−xjqj
)]
The first two equalities are by definition. The third equality follows from observing that for fixed C,
each term in the product depends only on the (independent) choice of pj and the adversary’s choice
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of cj , and are thus independent by our choice of adversary B˜∗. This step is the sole reason why it
was helpful to consider an adversarial strategy that treats columns independently. Now we want
to interchange the sum and product to obtain a product of identical terms, so we can analyze the
contribution of an individual term to the product.
E
p,C
[
e−αS
]
=
∑
C
d∏
j=1
E
p
[
pxj (1− p)n−xje−αcj
(
xjqj−n−xjqj
)]
=
(
n∑
x=0
(
n
x
)
E
p
[
px(1− p)n−xe−αc
(
xq−n−x
q
)])d
(independence of cj ’s)
=
(
n∑
x=0
(
n
x
)
Ax
)d
where
Ax =

(1− β)Ep [(1− p)n] + β Ep
[
(1− p)neαn/q] if x = 0
Ep [px(1− p)n−x] if 1 ≤ x ≤ n− 1
(1− β)Ep [pn] + β Ep [pneαnq] if x = n
First, observe that, since the distribution of p is symmetric about 1/2, A0 = An. Second, if we
let
Bx = E
p
[
px(1− p)n−x]
for every x = 0, 1, . . . , n, then we have
n∑
x=0
(
n
x
)
Ax =
(
n∑
x=0
(
n
x
)
Bx
)
+ 2(An −Bn)
= 1 + 2(An −Bn)
In order to obtain a strong enough bound, we need to show that An−Bn = O(βα). We can calculate
An −Bn = (1− β)E
p
[pn] + β E
p
[pneαnq]− E
p
[pn]
= β E
p
[pneαnq]− β E
p
[pn]
Now we apply the approximation eu ≤ 1 + 2u, which holds for 0 ≤ u ≤ 1. To do so, we choose
α =
√
t/n. Since q =
√
(1− p)/p and p ≥ t, we have αnq ≤ 1 for this choice of α. Thus we have
An −Bn = β E
p
[pneαnq]− β E
p
[pn]
≤ β E
p
[pn(1 + 2αnq)]− β E
p
[pn]
= 2βαE
p
[pnnq]
Now, to show that An −Bn = O(βα), we simply want to show that Ep [pnnq] = O(1), which we do
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by direct calculation.
E
p
[
pnn
√
1− p
p
]
= n
∫ pi/2−t′
t′
sin2n r
√
1−sin2 r
sin2 r
pi/2− 2t′ dr =
sin2n(pi/2− t′)− sin2n(t′)
pi − 4t′
=
(1− t)n − tn
pi − 4t′ =
(1− 1/300n)n − (1/300n)n
pi − 4t′ ≤
1
pi
The final inequality holds as long as n is larger than some absolute constant. (To see that this is the
case, recall that t′ = arcsin(
√
t) = arcsin(
√
1/300n) = Θ(1/
√
n), whereas (1−1/300n)n = 1−Ω(1).)
So we have established
An −Bn ≤ 2βα
pi
.
Plugging this fact into the analysis above, we have
E
p,C
[
e−αS
]
=
(
n∑
x=0
(
n
x
)
Ax
)d
= (1 + 2(An −Bn))d
≤
(
1 +
4βα
pi
)d
≤ e4βαd/pi
Now all that remains is to apply Markov’s inequality to bound this quantity by ξ
√
n/4.
Pr [S < −nZ/2] = Pr [−αS > αnZ/2]
= Pr
[
e−αS > eαnZ/2
]
≤ E
[
e−αS
]
eαnZ/2
≤ e
4βαd/pi
eαnZ/2
= e4βαd/pi−αnZ/2
To get the desired upper bound, it is sufficient to show
αnZ
2
− 4βαd
pi
≥
√
n log(1/ξ)
4
.
We calculate
αnZ
2
− 4βαd
pi
= 10
√
tn log(n/ξ)− 400β
pi
√
tn log(n/ξ)
=
(
10− 400β
pi
)(√
tn log(n/ξ)
)
≥
(
10− 400β
pi
) √
n log(n/ξ)
18
≥
√
n log(1/ξ)
4
where the last inequality holds when β < 1/25. This is sufficient to complete the proof of Claim
6.10.
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Combining Claims 6.9 and 6.10 yields Lemma 6.8 as follows. If S(c′) < nZ/2, then either
S(c˜) < nZ or S(c) < nZ/2. Moreover, if c′ ∈WF 1/25(C), we must have both c˜ ∈WF 0(C) and a
valid c. A union bound thereby gives us Lemma 6.8.
Lemma 6.7 and 6.8 are sufficient to imply Lemma 6.6, that Tardos’ fingerprinting code is weakly
robust. In order to apply our reduction from full robustness to weak robustness (Lemma 6.4), we
need to also establish that with high probability there are many marked columns in the matrix
C ←R Gen for Tardos’ fingerprinting code.
Lemma 6.12. With probability at least 1 − ξ over the choice of C ←R Gen, it holds that the
number of 0-marked columns m0 and the number of 1-marked columns m1 are both larger than
m = 5n3/2 log(n/ξ).
Proof of Lemma 6.12. To estimate the number of marked columns, define for each j = 1, . . . , d an
indicator random variable Dj for whether column j is 0-marked. The Dj ’s are i.i.d., and have
expectation at least
E [Dj |pj < 1/n] Pr[pj < 1/n] >
(
1− 1
n
)n
Pr[rj < arcsin(1/
√
n)] ≥ 1
6
√
n
.
Let D =
∑d
j=1Dj be the total number of 0- marked columns. Then E [D] ≥ 10n
√
n log(n/ξ), so by
the additive Chernoff bound (Theorem 5.15),
Pr[D < 5n
√
n log(n/ξ)] < exp
(−2(5n√n log(n/ξ))2
d
)
< ξ/2.
A similar argument holds for 1-marked columns. Thus letting m = 5n
√
n log(n/ξ), the codebook C
has at least m 0-marked columns and m 1-marked columns with probability at least 1− ξ. Now
observe that
exp(−Ω(βm2/d)) < exp(−Ω(βn log(n/ξ))) < ξ
for n larger than some absolute constant.
Combining Lemma 6.4 (reduction from robustness to weak robustness), Lemma 6.6 (weak
robustness of Tardos’ code), and Lemma 6.12 (Tardos’ code has many marked columns), suffices to
prove Theorem 6.2.
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A Lower Bounds on Fingerprinting Codes via Differential Privacy
By the contrapositive of Theorem 3.5, upper bounds on the sample complexity of answering 1-way
marginals with differential privacy imply a lower bound on the length d of any fingerprinting code
with a given number of users n. As pointed out to us by Adam Smith, this yields a particularly
simple, self-contained proof of Tardos’ [Tar08] optimal lower bound on the length of fingerprinting
codes. Specifically, using the well known Gaussian mechanism for achieving differential privacy, we
can design a simple adversary AFP that violates the security of any traitor tracing scheme with
length d = o(n2).
Theorem A.1. There is a function n = n(d) = O˜(
√
d) such that for every d, there is no (n, d)-
fingerprinting code with security ξ < 1/6en.
Proof. Before diving into the proof, we will state the following elementary fact about Gaussian
random variables. The fact simply says that a Gaussian random variable with suitable variance is
“close” to a shifted version of itself in a particular sense. This same fact is used to show that adding
Gaussian noise of suitable variance provides differential privacy.
Fact A.2. Let c, c′ ∈ Rd satisfy ‖c−c′‖2 ≤
√
d/n, δ > 0 be a parameter, and let σ2 = 2d ln(1/δ)/n2.
Let z ∈ Rd be a random vector where each coordinate is an independent draw from a Gaussian
distribution with mean 0 and variance σ2. Then for any (measurable) set T ⊆ Rd.
Pr
z
[c+ z ∈ T ] ≥ (1/e) Pr
z
[
c′ + z ∈ T ]− δ.
Now we proceed with the proof. Fix any choice of d. Assume towards a contradiction that there is
an (n, d)-fingerprinting code (Gen,Trace) with security ξ < 1/6en for n =
⌈√
18d ln(6en) ln(3d/2)
⌉
.
Observe that n = n(d) = O˜(
√
d) as promised in the theorem.
Let AFP (CS) be the following adversary. Define the vector c ∈ [0, 1]d as
c =
1
n
∑
i∈S
ci.
52
Now, let z ∈ Rd be a d-dimensional Gaussian where every coordinate is independent with mean 0
and variance σ2 = 2d ln(1/δ)/n2, for δ = 1/6en. Finally, let c′ be cˆ with each coordinate rounded to
{0, 1}, and output the pirated codeword c′.
First we claim that AFP outputs feasible codewords with at least constant probability.
Claim A.3. For every S such that |S| ≥ n− 1, and every codebook C = (cij) ∈ {0, 1}n×d,
Pr
c′←RAFP (CS)
[
c′ ∈ F (CS)
] ≥ 2/3.
Proof of Claim A.3. By a standard tail bound for the Gaussian, we have
Pr
[
∀ j, |zj | < σ
√
ln(3d/2)
]
≥ 2/3.
Thus, by our choice of σ and n ≥ √18d ln(1/δ) ln(3d/2) we have Pr [∀ j, |zj | < 1/3] ≥ 2/3. Now
the claim follows easily. Specifically, if cij = 1 for every i ∈ S, then (1/n)
∑
i∈S cij ≥ 1− 1/n, so
cˆj > 2/3− 1/n and c′j = 1. A similar argument applies if cij = 0 for every i ∈ S.
Now it remains to show that AFP cannot be traced successfully. By assumption (Gen,Trace)
has security ξ < 1/6en < 1/3. Then we have in particular
Pr
C←RGen
c′←RAFP (C)
[
c′ ∈ F (C) ∧ Trace(C, c′) = ⊥] < ξ.
Combining with Claim A.3 we have
Pr
C←RGen
c′←RAFP (C)
[
Trace(C, c′) ∈ [n]] > 1− 1/3− ξ > 1/3.
Therefore, there exists i∗ ∈ [n] such that
Pr
C←RGen
c′←RAFP (C)
[
Trace(C, c′) = i∗
]
> 1/3n. (10)
To complete the proof, it now suffices to show that if S = [n] \ {i∗}, then
Pr
C←RGen
c′←RAFP (CS)
[
Trace(C, c′) = i∗
] ≥ 1/6en > ξ,
which will contradict the security of the fingerprinting code.
To do so, first observe that if
c =
1
n
∑
i∈[n]
ci, and c
S =
1
n
∑
i∈S
ci,
then ‖cj − cSj ‖2 ≤
√
d/n. Now, in case the tracing algorithm is randomized, let Tracer denote the
tracing algorithm when run with its random coins fixed to r. For any string of random coins r,
define the set Tr = {t ∈ Rd | Tracer(C, round(t)) = i∗}. Here, round(·) is the function that rounds
each entry of its input to {0, 1}.13
13Note, for completeness, that Tr is measurable, since the set of c
′ ∈ {0, 1}d such that Tracer(C, c′) = i∗ is finite
(for every fixed n, d) and for every c′, {t | round(t) = c′} is a hypercube, so Tr is a union of finitely many hypercubes.
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By Fact A.2 (with δ = 1/6en > ξ), for every r,
Pr
z
[
cS + z ∈ Tr
] ≥ (1/e) Pr
z
[c+ z ∈ Tr]− ξ.
Applying (10), and averaging over C ←R Gen and r, we have
Pr
C←RGen
c′←RAFP (CS)
[
Trace(C, c′) = i∗
] ≥ (1/e)(1/3n)− 1/6en = 1/6en > ξ,
which is the desired contradiction. This completes the proof.
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